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Abstract 
 
The Malacca Straits considered to be the busiest and is one of the world’s most dangerous 
shipping lanes in the world because of its heavy traffic, narrowness, sharp turns, and many 
other critical factors. Therefore, maritime safety in the Strait of Malacca is an important 
issue. With a length of approximately 500 mi (800 km), the Strait of Malacca is the longest 
strait in the world used for international navigation. It forms the main seaway connecting the 
Indian Ocean with the China Sea and provides the shortest route for tankers shuttling between 
the Middle East and Asian countries. Therefore, this strait is the busiest shipping lane in the 
world. Safety of navigation has been focusing on issues of security, loss of lives and property. 
Moreover the concern for environmental protection and collision avoidance are going 
significantly. The objectives of International Maritime Organization (IMO) of implementing 
an automatic identification system (AIS) are to enhance the safety and efficiency of 
navigation, safety of life at sea, and protection of maritime environment. 
The thesis conducted the implementation of AIS for analysis and evaluates the marine traffic 
safety in the Malacca Straits. The purpose of research studies are summarized as follow: to 
evaluate the danger score in the Malacca Straits, to evaluate the risk of collision in the 
Malacca Straits  and to assess the safety of navigation in the Malacca Straits. In order to 
purpose of this research, several chapters are established. 
In Chapter 1, the background consisting of the reason of the research studies is explored. In 
addition, the study areas are described. In Chapter 2, AIS installation and investigation were 
described. AIS implemented as source of data for the analysis and evaluate the marine traffic 
safety in the Malacca Straits. In Chapter 3, the evaluation of marine traffic safety in the 
Malacca Straits is established. In this chapter, the danger score in the Malacca Straits using 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and AIS are conducted. AIS is implemented as a source of 
data that describe the characteristics of ship traffic density determined using a geographic 
information system (GIS).  AHP is then used for evaluating the safety level in the Strait of 
Malacca. In this case, weighting factors are determined using AHP. The evaluation criteria 
were divided into five: Ship condition, human factor, environmental factor, machinery factor 
and management factor. Each criterion divides into sub criteria and sub-sub criteria. 
 
x 
 
In Chapter 4, the evaluation of risk for formal safety assessment (FSA) is established. In this 
study, hazard identification and risk evaluation of ship collision as step of formal safety 
assessment have been established. In this case, the traditional failure mode and effects 
analysis (FMEA) determines the risk priorities of failure modes called risk priority numbers 
(RPNs), which require the risk factors like the occurrence (O), severity (S) and detection (D). 
The risk factors O, S, D as fuzzy variable and evaluate them using fuzzy method. an 
Automatic Identification System is implemented for the study on collision using fuzzy logic 
method under The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 
(COLREG) guidelines. AIS implemented as source of data and input for the hazard 
identification and risk evaluation using fuzzy logic method as step of formal safety 
assessment. 
In Chapter 5, the safety of navigation assessment by considering traffic density is established. 
This study focus for usage of AIS and GIS to establish risk based navigation. Risk assessment 
includes the probability analysis and consequence analysis. In this case, the analysis of risk 
determined in the different condition and different time based on AIS data taken from AIS 
receiver system which have installed in the UTM Malaysia by Kobe University. Analysis of 
risk divided into 3 conditions; head on condition, crossing condition and overtaking 
condition. 
In Chapter 6, the discussions regarding how the results of research in Chapter 2 until chapter 
5 are described. Several consideration of analysis and implementation of AIS for marine 
traffic safety in the Malacca Straits are shown in respect to ship safety of navigation in the 
marine traffic. Finally, the further researches are shown. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
The Malacca Straits is vital strategic for seaborne trade. However, it is a risk area for 
navigation. The analysis of marine traffic safety in the Malacca Straits is very important to 
enhance navigational safety.  Navigational collisions are major safety concern in many sea 
ports. The Malacca Straits, considered to be the busiest shipping lane in the world, is located 
between the east coast of Sumatra Island in Indonesia and the west coast of Peninsular 
Malaysia, and is linked to the Straits of Singapore at its southeast end. With a length of 
approximately 500 miles (800 km), the Malacca Straits is the longest strait in the world used 
for international navigation. It forms the main seaway connecting the Indian Ocean with the 
China Sea and provides the shortest route for tankers shuttling between the Middle East and 
Asian countries. The Malacca Straits is a high-risk area for navigation. For centuries, 
concerns over safety in navigation have focused on issues of security and loss of lives and 
property. Currently, there is growing concern over environmental protection. The increasing 
traffic through the Malacca Straits poses significant risks to the navigation, marine 
environment, and to the fishing and tourism industries.   
Based on the statistical data for the types of casualties for 1978–1994 in the Malacca 
Straits; the following set of vessel-related casualties in the Malacca straits were considered: 
(1) fire explosions, (2) stranded/grounded, (3) spring leaks, (4) collisions, and (5) other. 
Based on that fact, the analysis and evaluation of safety navigation in the Malacca Straits 
should be established. Using AIS data, the evaluation of marine traffic safety is conducted. 
Regulation 19 of SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) Chapter V - Carriage requirements 
for shipborne navigational systems and equipment - sets out navigational equipment to be 
carried on board, according to ship type. IMO (International Maritime Organization) adopted 
a new requirement (as part of a revised new chapter V) for all ships to carry AIS capable of 
providing information about the ship to other ships and to coastal authorities automatically.
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Figure 1.1: Actual condition in the Malacca Straits 
In this research, human factors are founded as greatest factors than other that contribute the 
accident in the Malacca Straits.  Fig. 1.1 shows the actual condition in the Malacca Straits. 
Some navigators feel worried during pass in the Straits. This condition needed to be more 
careful when transiting the Straits. The danger score by considering ship condition, human 
factors, environmental factors, machinery factors, and navigational factors are established 
using AHP and AIS, which are described in Chapter 3, followed by AIS system installation 
works described in chapter 2 
The collision is important issue which has occurred in the Malacca Straits. In this 
research, as shown in Chapter 4, risk evaluations of ship collision are evaluated as step of 
formal safety assessment. The result is value of risk ranking which has determined using 
failure mode effect analysis and fuzzy logic method. AIS data is used as source data for make 
classification of ship behaviour and traffic volume. 
The results of research in Chapter 5 show the analysis of safety of navigation by 
considering the traffic density. In this case, risk assessment is established. Based on AIS data, 
the scenario of risk assessment have been carried out with different time with actual data. The 
risk level has been established in Head on condition, crossing condition and overtaking 
condition. scenario taken in the time which have high traffic area, on 2.00h, 10.00h, and 
22.00h. The discussion of ship collision probability analysis and consequence analysis are 
explored in this Chapter. 
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Indonesia and the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, and is linked with the Strait of 
Singapore at its south-east end.  
 The Strait of Malacca is bordered on the north-west by a line from Ujung Baka 
(5°40’N, 95°26’E), the north-west extremity of Sumatra, to Laem Phra Chao (7°45’N, 
98°18’E), the south extremity of Ko Phuket Island, Thailand, and on the south-east by a line 
from Tahan (Mount) Datok (1°20’E, 104°20’N) and Tanjung Pergam (1°10’E,104°20’N). 
The increasing traffic through the Malacca Straits poses significant risks to the biodiversity 
and the marine environment, to the livelihood of the coastal communities and to the fishing 
and tourism industries.  Therefore, current safety measures should be improved and 
supported with the relevant complementary services to face the challenges of development in 
East Asia associated with the increase in international shipping.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
 
2.1 Background of AIS 
An automatic identification system allows monitoring of ships and other ships from 
the land station (Vessel Traffic Service), and operating on VHF frequency band. The AIS is a 
Very High Frequency (VHF) radio broadcasting system that transfers packets of data over the 
VHF data link (VDL) and enables AIS equipped vessels and shore-based stations to send and 
receive identification information that can be displayed on an electronic chart, computer 
display or compatible radar. This information can help in situational awareness and provide a 
means to assist in collision avoidance. In addition, AIS also has the characteristics and the 
ability to improve navigation safety and efficiency of the management of marine traffic. AIS 
also can be used as an aid to navigation, by providing location and additional information on 
buoys and lights. 
The AIS station is a radio transmitter capable of sending ship information such as 
position, speed, ship length, ship type and cargo information, etc by VHF electric waves. 
When used with graphic displays, AIS on ships allow to receive the information quickly, 
automatic and precision of information about risk by calculating closest point of approach 
(CPA) and time to closest point of Approach (TCPA) of vessel position information is 
transmitted. 
Since 2002, new ships and later all larger sea-going vessels (>300 GT) and all 
passenger vessels are required to carry an AIS on board. IMO  and SOLAS  requires AIS 
to be fitted aboard international voyaging ships with gross tonnage (GT) of 300 and upwards 
engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged 
on international voyages and all passenger ships irrespective of size. 
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The regulation requires that AIS shall: 
 provide information - including the ship's identity, type, position, course, speed, 
navigational status and other safety-related information-automatically to appropriately 
equipped shore stations, other ships and aircraft. 
 receive automatically such information from similarly fitted ships, monitor and track 
ships. 
 exchange data with shore-based facilities. 
 
2.2 AIS Installation 
The AIS is a tool that has many applications. AIS works best over a range of a few 
miles as the AIS signal is more or less limited to line of sight to the horizon (usually 10-20 
miles). However, by getting together a group of amateur shipping enthusiasts around the 
country equipped with suitable receivers and aerials, ships can be tracked over longer 
distances. 
Based on IMO Resolution MSC.74 (69), Annex 3 about Recommendation on 
Performance Standards for An Universal shipborne an automatic identification system, these 
standards establish the basic performance requirements for AIS equipment and are used by 
the International Telecommunications Union and the International Electro Technical 
Commission standard in technical development and testing. The AIS should improve the 
efficient for ship safety navigation, environmental protection, and operation of Vessel Traffic 
System (VTS), by following some of the following conditions: 
a. Can avoid collision / accident between vessels 
b. To find information about the ship and its cargo 
c. AIS is as a tool for VTS for traffic management 
The data transmitted by the AIS are: 
a. For Class A AIS each 2 to 10 seconds will provide information in accordance with the 
speed of the vessel, and every 3 minutes at anchorage, will provide the following 
information: 
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1. MMSI (maritime mobile service identity) number – unique reference able 
identification.  
2. Navigation status – not only are “at anchor” and “under way using engine” 
currently defined, but “not under comment” is also currently defined.  
3. Rate of turn – right or left, 0 to 720 degrees per minute.  
4. Speed over ground – 1/10 knot resolution from 0 to 120 knots.  
5. Position accuracy – differential GPS or other and an indication if RAIM 
processing is being used. 
6. Longitude – to 1/1000 minute and latitude – to 1/10000 minute. 
7. Course over ground – relative to true north to 1/10
th
degree . 
8.  True heading – 0 to 359 degrees derived from gyro input.  
9. Time stamp – the universal time to nearest second that this information was 
generated.  
 
In the class A, for each 6 minute AIS will provide the following information: 
1. MMSI number – same unique identification used above, links the data above to 
described vessel.  
2. IMO number – unique reference able identification (related to ship’s 
construction).  
3. Radio call sign – international call sign assigned to vessel often used on voice 
radio.  
4. Name – name of ship, 20 characters are provided.  
5. Type of ship/cargo – there is table of possibilities that are available.  
6. Dimensions of ship – to nearest meter.  
7. Location of ship where reference point for position reports is located.  
8. Type of position fixing device – various options from differential GPS to 
undefined.  
9. Draught of ship – 1/10 meter to 25.5 meters (note “air-draught” is not provided).  
10. Destination – 20 characters are provided.  
11. Estimated time of arrival at destination –month, day, hour, and minute in UTC.  
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There are two classes of AIS, Class A and Class B, as well as different types of AIS 
used for shore stations (AIS Base Stations), aids to navigation (AIS AtoN), AIS on search 
and rescue aircraft and AIS search and rescue transmitters (AIS SART). 
 
 Table 2.1: Class of AIS 
 
For this research, the actual sea traffic conditions of the Malacca Straits were recorded 
by an AIS data receiving system installed in the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Malaysia. 
The equipment was used to collect the data. All AIS data received by the equipment were 
continuously and automatically stored on the hard disk of a PC. The data could be retrieved 
from the PC via the Internet and analyzed on another PC at any time. 
 
 
 
 
AIS Class A Class A has been mandated by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) for vessels of 300 gross tonnage and upwards 
engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage 
and upwards not engaged on international voyages, as well as 
passenger ships (more than 12 passengers), irrespective of size. 
AIS Class B Class B provides limited functionality and is intended for 
non-SOLAS vessels. It is not mandated by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) and has been developed for vessels such as work 
craft and pleasure craft. 
AIS Base Station Base Stations are provided by aids to navigation authority to enable 
the ship to shore / shore to ship transmission of information. 
Networked AIS Base Stations can assist in providing overall 
maritime domain awareness. 
AIS aids to 
navigation (AtoN) 
AIS AtoN provide an opportunity to transmit position and status of 
buoys and lights through the same VDL, which can then show up on 
an electronic chart, computer display or compatible radar. 
AIS SART Search and Rescue Transmitters using AIS can be used to assist in 
determining the location of a vessel in distress. 
AIS on Search and  
Aircraft 
Search and Rescue Aircraft may use AIS to assist in their operations. 
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2.3 AIS Data Analysis 
2.3.1 AIS Data Analysis for Evaluate Marine Traffic Safety 
Below are results of AIS data investigation in the Malacca Straits. These data used for 
analysis of marine traffic safety in the Malacca Straits. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Traffic volume of 12 days in January 2010 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Traffic volume per hour in January 2010 
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Figure 2.3: Ships population data in January 2010 
 
The analysis results of the traffic volume in January 2010 are shown in Figs. 2.1 and 
2.2.  Figure 2.1 shows the traffic volume of 12 days in January. The greatest volume of data 
per day was received on 1/23/2010, when the number of ships was 1,446. The fewest ships 
were in the Straits on the 1/20/2010, when only 1, 149 ships were recorded. 
Figure 2.2 shows the traffic volume per hour on 1/23/2010. A sharp rise in the number 
of ships can be seen around 16.00h, when the number of ships was 1,118. The period with the 
fewest ships occurs in the early hours of the morning, until around 04.00h. 
Figure 2.3 shows the population of ships passing through the Strait of Malacca on 
1/23/2010. This is broken down between: tanker ships (37%), cargo ships (26%), tugs (9%), 
passenger ships (3%), towing and fishing vessels (1%), other ships (10%), and unknown 
vessels (14%). 
 
2.3.2 AIS Data Analysis for Risk Evaluation 
The AIS data analysis for risk evaluation of marine traffic is shown in figure 2.4-2.10. On the 
basis of the AIS data, an analysis of ship encounter situations has been established. The AIS 
data analysis is also useful for analyzing the traffic density, the ship collision probability and 
the area dangerous for navigation. 
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Figure 2.4: Traffic volume per day in June 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Traffic volume per hour during one week in June 2010 
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Figure 2.6: Average number of ships per hour in June 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Type of ships 
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Figure 2.8: LOA of ships 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Heading angle of ships 
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Figure 2.10: Speed of ships 
 
The analysis results related to the number of ships in June 2010 are shown in Figs. 2.4, 
2.5, and 2.6. Figure 2.4 shows that the highest number of ships was recorded on 06/15/2010, 
when the number of ships was 287. Figure 2.4 also shows that the number of ships tends to 
gradually decrease from 06/21/2010 except for the sharp increase on 06/29/2010. The lowest 
number of ships was recorded on the 6/30/2010 when the number of ships was 242. 
Figure 2.5 shows the traffic volume data that was recorded during one week from 
06/01/2010 to 06/07/2010. The figure also shows that the traffic volume tends to mostly rise 
from 00.00h to 17.00h before declining from 18.00h. The lowest traffic volume period 
occurred in the early morning hours between 00.00h and 03.00h. Additionally, the highest 
traffic volume was recorded on 4 June 2010 at 12.00h. The lowest number was recorded on 1 
June 2010 at 2.00h. The average of number of ships per hour during the whole week from 
06/01/2010 to 06/07/2010 is shown in Fig.2.6. 
The type of ships passing through the Malacca Straits on 06/04/2010 are shown in 
Fig.2.7. It is broken down as: tanker ships (46%), cargo ships (27%), tugs (8%), passenger 
ships (8%), LNG (5%) and other ships 5%. 
The lengths over all (LOA) of the ships that are passing through the selected area in 
the Malacca Straits are shown in Fig. 2.8. The percentages are as follows: LOA>200m (49%), 
100<LOA<200m (31%), 50<LOA<100m (7%) and LOA <50m (13%). 
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Fig.2. 12: Number of ship per hour in June 2010 based on selected area. 
 
 
 
The analysis results of number of ship in June 2010 are shown in Fig. 2.11 and 2.12.  
Highest number of ships was found on 6/1/2010, when the number of ships was 657.  
Lowest number of ships period occurs on the 6/27/2010 when the number of ships was 575. 
The Fig. 2.11 also shows that the number of ships tends to rise on 6/1/2010 before 
declining from 6/5/2010. Fig. 2.12 shows the ship traffic density per hour on 6/1/2010. It 
shows that the number of ships tends to rise 19.00h, when the number of ships was 164. The 
lowest number of ships period occurs in the morning hours after 24.00 and continuous until 
around 03.00. 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
This chapter presents the AIS analysis for evaluation of marine traffic safety. The actual sea 
traffic condition of the Malacca Straits was recorded by an AIS data receiving system 
installed at the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. In this study, the analysis of AIS data is 
required in order to evaluate the dangerous area and risk of collision and safety of navigation 
in the Malacca Straits. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Evaluation of Marine Traffic Safety  
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The Strait of Malacca, considered to be the busiest shipping lane in the world, is 
located between the east coast of Sumatra Island in Indonesia and the west coast of 
Peninsular Malaysia, and is linked to the Straits of Singapore at its southeast end. With a 
length of approximately 500 miles (800 km), the Strait of Malacca is the longest strait in the 
world used for international navigation. It forms the main seaway connecting the Indian 
Ocean with the China Sea and provides the shortest route for tankers shuttling between the 
Middle East and Asian countries.  
The Strait of Malacca is a high-risk area for navigation. It is not surprising that in a 
recent survey; more than 80% of captains of VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) responded 
that they are worried when navigating the strait. For centuries, concerns over safety in 
navigation have focused on issues of security and loss of lives and property. Currently, there 
is growing concern over environmental protection. For the Strait of Malacca, an analysis of 
the casualty data between 1975 and 1995 shows that serious accidents have occurred in 
high-density traffic areas .The objectives of IMO of implementing an automatic identification 
system are to enhance the safety and efficiency of navigation, safety of life at sea, and 
protection of maritime environment (IMO, 2001). The principal aim of this study is to 
determine the danger score in the Strait of Malacca by the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) 
using the AIS data. In this study, the AIS is implemented as a source of data that describes 
the characteristics of ship traffic density determined using a geographic information system.  
AHP is then used for evaluating the safety level in the Strait of Malacca. In this study, 
weighting factors are determined using AHP. 
This Chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, The background of the 
researches introduced present a literature review in the second section. Herein, we have 
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discussed the originality of this research and the applicability of the selected method through 
the literature review. In the third section, we investigate the sea traffic in the Strait of 
Malacca using the AIS data and GIS, which includes the traffic volume of the strait. In the 
fourth section, an AHP for the evaluation of marine traffic safety is described. Here, the 
construction of AHP is discussed. Finally, the simulation result of the danger score is 
presented. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
Several authors have used AHP for research purpose in several fields. Hoang Nguyen 
[6] has discussed the application of AHP in the risk estimation for ship systems. AHP has 
been used for estimating the proportional contributions of individual subsystems and units in 
the reliability structure of propulsion systems. 
Arslan et al. [4] analyzed the marine casualties in the Strait of Istanbul using 
SWOT-AHP. The objective of this study was to examine SWOT factors in greater detail and 
more systematically and then formulate clear and applicable strategies for safe marine 
operations in the Strait of Istanbul. They also developed a strategy action plan for ships, ship 
operators, ship management companies, and seafarers through a SWOT analysis and the 
AHP, to ensure safer navigational operations in the Strait of Istanbul and prevent the 
re-occurrence of marine casualties.  
Kwok et al. [5] used AHP to determine priorities in a safety management system. In 
this case, AHP was used to determine the priority of processes outlined in the BS8800 Guide 
to Occupational Health and Safety Management System for the Hong Kong construction 
industry.  
Ying et al. [10], in their paper, have discussed about combining the AHP with a GIS 
for the synthetic evaluation of eco-environmental quality. Using the GIS and the regional 
eco-environmental information system database and assuming the county as the evaluation 
unit, they evaluated the eco-environmental quality of hunan province by integrating an 
eco-environmental evaluation index method and a spatial analysis. 
Qigang et al. [8] used AHP and a GIS for the evaluation of hazard degrees in the 
Wanzahou district of the Three Gorges Reservoir area. The model was established by GIS 
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techniques using land use/cover, stratum characteristics, slope aspect, slope gradient, 
elevation difference, and slope shape as the evaluation factors. The weights of the factors 
were established by AHP. 
Tesfamariam et al. [9] analyzed risk-based environmental decision-making using a 
fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (F-AHP). In their paper, vagueness-type uncertainty is 
considered using fuzzy-based techniques. The AHP is modified into fuzzy AHP using a fuzzy 
arithmetic operation. The concept of risk attitude and the associated confidence of a 
decision-maker on the estimates of pair-wise comparisons are also discussed. 
There are some studies in the literature that consider the issue of an automatic 
identification system. Mou et al. [7] used AIS data to analyze collision avoidance in busy 
waterways. They performed statistical analysis of ships involved in collisions. The authors 
take only into account ships (own ships) that have an encounter in the Traffic Separation 
Schema (TSS) of the port of Rotterdam. 
Pitana et al. [2] analyzed the evacuation of a large passenger vessel in the case of a 
pending tsunami using discrete event simulation (DES), which is considered to be a 
stochastic approach. In this paper, the authors used the AIS data to calculate the sea traffic in 
the area. 
Kobayashi et al. [1] proposed a guideline for ship evacuation in the case of a tsunami 
attack. In their paper, AIS data was used for an analysis of ships passing through Osaka Bay, 
Japan. 
The main focus of this research is to determine the danger score in the Strait of 
Malacca using the AHP based on the AIS data. In this study, the AIS is implemented as a 
source of data that describes the characteristics of ships’ traffic volume determined using a 
geographic information system.  AHP is therefore used for evaluating the safety level in the 
Strait of Malacca. In this case, weighting factors are determined using AHP. The evaluation 
criteria are divided into five items: ship condition, human factor, environmental factor, 
machinery factor and navigational factor. Each criterion divides into sub-criteria and 
sub-sub-criteria. 
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3.3 Investigation of Sea Traffic by AIS 
 
The AIS is designed to provide information about a ship to other ships and to coastal 
authorities, automatically. Regulation 19 of SOLAS Chapter V “Carriage requirements for 
shipborne navigational systems and equipment” sets out the navigational equipment that must 
be carried on board ships, based on ship type. In 2000, the IMO added a new requirement (as 
part of a revision to Chapter V) for all ships to carry AIS capable of providing information 
about the ship to other ships and to coastal authorities, automatically.  
The AIS is also designed to transmit and receive information about a vessel. This 
information includes its identity, position, speed, and course, along with other relevant 
information. Vessels within the AIS range can receive information transmitted by other 
vessels and display this information on a dedicated AIS display, a chartplotter, or a PC using 
navigation software. Combined with a shore station, this system also offers port authorities 
and maritime safety bodies the ability to manage maritime traffic and reduce the hazards of 
marine navigation. 
According to the IMO, in 2002, AIS information includes static, dynamic, and 
voyage-related elements. Static information is programmed into the unit at the time of 
commissioning. Dynamic information is derived from interfaces with a ship’s GPS and other 
sensors. Voyage-related data are entered manually by the ship's captain using a 
password-protected routine. 
 
3.3.1 AIS Receiving System 
 
The actual sea traffic conditions of several ships in the Strait of Malacca were 
investigated using an AIS receiver installed at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) in 
Malaysia. All AIS data received by the equipment were continuously and automatically 
stored on the hard disk of a PC. The data could be retrieved from the PC via the Internet and 
analyzed on another PC at any time. 
In this context, static information includes the vessel's maritime mobile service 
identity, the name of the vessel, radio call sign, ship length, the draft of the ship, the IMO 
number, ship width, type of ship, and antenna position. Dynamic information includes the 
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longitude, latitude, time, course, rate of turn, and speed over ground. Voyage-related 
information includes the draft of the ship, destination, and type of cargo.  
 
3.3.2 AIS Data Analysis 
Figure 3.1 shows the photograph of AIS receiving system at Universiti Teknologi 
Malaysia in Malaysia. 
The study area of this research is shown in Fig 1.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Photograph of AIS receiving system 
 
 
The analysis results of the traffic volume in January 2010 are shown in Chapter 2, in Figs. 2.1 
and 2.2.   
 
3.4 The AHP Methodology 
 
The AHP is a method and a simple decision-making tool developed by Saaty (1980) 
to deal with complex, unstructured, and multi-attribute problems. The AHP integrates an 
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expert’s opinion and evaluation scores and converts the complex decision-making system 
into a simple elementary hierarchy system. There are some key steps to making decisions in 
an organized way, to generate priorities and to decompose a complex multi criteria 
decision-making (MCDM) problem.  These steps include: 
1. Define the problem and determine the objective. 
2. Develop the decision hierarchy from the top with the goal of the decision, then the 
objectives from a broad perspective, through the intermediate levels (criteria on which 
subsequent elements depend) to the lowest level. 
3. Construct a set of pair-wise comparison matrices. Each element in an upper level is 
used to compare the elements in the level immediately below. 
4. Use the priorities obtained from the comparisons to weigh the priorities in the level. 
Continue this process of weighting and adding until the final priorities of the alternatives in 
the bottom most level are obtained. 
In the AHP, the structure of the hierarchy is a very important factor. The AHP 
initially breaks down a complex MCDM into a hierarchy of interrelated decision elements. 
Figure 3.2 shows the structure of the constructed hierarchy. The decision goal is at the top 
level, while the decision criteria are sub-criteria in the middle level and sub-sub-criteria are in 
the bottom level. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Hierarchy for MCDM problem 
GOAL
Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Criterion 4 Criterion 5
Sub 
Criterion 1
Sub 
Criterion 2
Sub 
Criterion 3
Sub 
Criterion 4
Sub 
Criterion 5
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Table 3.1 shows a nine-point pair-wise comparison scale typically used in the AHP. 
The AHP helps to perform a pair-wise comparison the criteria at a particular level of the 
hierarchy, to find out which of the criteria the decision-maker wants to assign the highest 
priority. While comparing those criteria qualitatively, some corresponding scale values are 
assigned to them. 
Table 3.1: Nine-point pair-wise comparison scale of AHP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3.2: Random inconsistency index (RI) 
 
 
 
3.4.1 Calculation of Comparison Matrix 
In this step, the pair-wise comparison matrix is calculated. The matrix is expressed 
by: 
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Point Definition 
1 Indifferent 
3 
Weak preference (moderately more 
important) 
5 Preference (more important) 
7 Strong preference (strongly more important) 
9 
Very strong preference (extremely more 
important) 
2, 4, 6, 
and 8 
Intermediate values between the two adjacent 
scale values (used to represent compromise 
between the priorities listed above) 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RI 0 0 0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.49 
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3.4.2 Priority Vector 
 
Having a comparison matrix, we can compute the priority vector, which is the 
normalized eigenvector of the matrix. In this case, the relative weight can be easily obtained 
from each of the rows of matrix A. In other words, matrix A has rank 1, and the following 
holds: 
 
                 A W= n W                         (3.2) 
 
where W = (w1,w2,..,wn) and n is the number of elements. In matrix algebra, n and W in 
(3.2) are called the eigen value and the right eigenvector of matrix A.   
In the AHP, the evaluator does not know W and, therefore, is unable to accurately 
produce the pair-wise relative weights of matrix A. Thus, the observed matrix A contains 
inconsistencies. The estimation of  ̂  could be obtained similarly by: 
 
                 ̂* ̂ = λ max *  ̂                  (3.3) 
 
where  ̂ is the observed matrix of pair-wise comparisons, λmax is the largest eigenvalue 
of  ̂, and  ̂ is its right eigenvector.  ̂ constitutes the estimation of W. 
 
 
3.4.3 Consistency Index and Consistency Ratio  
 
 
We test the consistency of the judgment matrix to make sure it is maintained. We define 
CI as follows: 
 
                    CI = (λ max -n)/(n-1)                          (3.4) 
 
where CI is the consistency index, λmax is the largest principal eigenvalue of the matrix, 
which can be easily calculated, and n is the order of the matrix. Then, the consistency ratio 
(CR) is calculated as follows: 
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                    CR=CI/RI ≤0.1                              (3.5) 
 
 
where RI is the random inconsistency index, which depends on the order of the matrix [26]. 
 
The RI is the average value of the CI, if the entries in the pair-wise comparison matrix 
were chosen at random. RI values determined from Saaty`s information and Saaty`s 
procedure. To calculate the CI/RI score, the team first gets the standard RI value from Saaty`s 
information. If CR 0.10, the pair-wise comparison matrix is thought to have an acceptable 
consistency. Otherwise, the matrix should be changed. The calculated results for the weights 
are accepted when the consistency ratio is satisfactory. Table 3.2 shows the value of the 
random inconsistency index for a pair-wise comparison matrix with orders of 1 to 10. 
 
3.5 Proposed Model Using AHP 
 
 
In this research, the AHP was combined with AIS data in order to determine the 
danger score in the Strait of Malacca. AIS is implemented as a source of data that describes 
the characteristics of ship traffic volume determined using a geographic information system. 
The AIS data is also used for determining the number of ships, ships’ behavior and ships’ 
traffic in the strait. AHP is therefore used for evaluating the navigation safety level in the 
Strait of Malacca. In this case, weighting factors are determined using AHP. The evaluation 
criteria were divided into five: ship condition, human factor, environmental factor, machinery 
factor and navigational factor. Each criterion divides into sub-criteria and sub-sub-criteria. 
Combining AHP and AIS, the danger score could be determined. In this paper, the danger 
score in the Strait of Malacca was determined for different ships at different time steps. 
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3.6  AHP Design and Application to Assessment of Danger  
Score 
 
3.6.1 Conceptual Framework of Danger Score 
 
Figure 3.3: Framework for assessment of danger score by AHP 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the framework for the assessment of danger score. In this 
framework, several steps are shown, which are related to the Strait of Malacca, marine traffic 
safety analysis, AHP, an automatic identification system and a geographic information 
system. What follows next is the investigation of the AIS data using MySQL. In this step, 
several data pertaining to the ship, such as size, velocity, longitude, latitude, IMO Number, 
MMSI, type, name, etc., are obtained. The population of ships and the traffic densities, per 
day and per hour are calculated. These data are then input into the GIS to visualize the 
location of ships in the Strait of Malacca. 
Start
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Next, a questionnaire is prepared to collect perception data. In this research, A total of 
41 questionnaires were distributed among pilots (10), masters (10), officers (10), and others 
crewmembers (11) who have navigated across the Strait of Malacca.   The results of the 
questionnaire are required to determine the danger score using AHP and the comparison 
matrix and to determine the weight of different criteria and sub criteria. In the next step, the 
danger score assessment and simulation using the AIS and GIS are carried out.  
 
3.6.2 Selection of Assessment Criteria and Construction of   Hierarchical 
Structure 
 
This study attempts to evaluate the marine traffic safety in the Strait of Malacca based 
upon an assessment of danger scores. In this step, the structure of the AHP is designed as 
shown in Figure. 3.4. For the proposed methodology in this research, the establishment of the 
hierarchical structure for danger score assessment is important. In this context, selection 
criteria and sub criteria was conducted. Some keys and steps involved in this methodology 
are: (1) Proposed selection criteria and sub criteria of hierarchical structure for danger score 
from the literature. (2) Interview to the relevant experts and professionals in the maritime 
field about the factors that contribute to the accidents and danger in the Strait of Malacca. To 
accomplish the proposed model using AHP, a questionnaire was designed based on AHP 
structured for data collection that was distributed to the navigators and crew members who 
have experience in passing through the Strait of Malacca. A questionnaire has been compiled 
based on the AHP structure. In this context, respondents who are selected to fill out the 
questionnaire were navigators and other crewmembers of ships that have knowledge of and 
experience in passing through the Strait of Malacca.  
Based on the hierarchical structure of the AHP and a comparison matrix, we can 
compute the priority vector, which is the normalized eigenvector of the matrix. In the AHP 
structure, a goal is specified at the top level, all the objectives or criteria are listed at the 
second level and the last level presents all sub- criteria. For this application, the evaluation 
criteria were divided into five categories: ship condition, human factors, environmental 
factors, machinery factors and navigational factors. 
The ship condition consists of 4 sub criteria: type of ship, length of ship, speed of 
ship, and state of loading. Human factors consist of 5 sub criteria: communication, 
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knowledge and skills, experience, overworked, and fatigue. The criteria of environmental 
factors consist of 10 sub criteria: wind effect, current influence, speed relative to another 
ship, other vessel's length, relation between water line and depth, distance between vessels, 
own ship course and course of another ship, time zone, influence associated with day of the 
week and characteristics of the area.  Characteristic of area defines the encountered ships 
areas: head on area, crossing area and overtaking area.  In the characteristics of the area, the 
configuration of the Strait of Malacca as a congested area is also considered. The traffic 
volume, the narrowness of the strait, the sharp turns etc. are also taken into account. The 
machinery factors consist of 6 sub criteria: failure of main engine and electrical, failure of 
rudder, failure of propulsion, failure of lubricating oil, failure of navigation equipment, and 
failure of hull equipment. The navigational factors consist of three sub criteria: 
inappropriateness of ship operation regulation management, inappropriateness of crew 
manning, and inappropriate navigational aids.  
The sub-criteria of type of ship, length of ship, speed of ship, and state of loading 
consist of several sub-sub-criteria or indicators. The sub criteria of current influence, speed 
relative to another ship, other vessel's length, relation between water line and depth, distance 
between vessels, own ship course and course of another ship, time zone, and influence of the 
day of the week also consist of several sub-sub-criteria or indicators. 
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Figure 3.4: Hierarchical structure for danger score assessment 
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3.6.3 Results of AHP Application 
 
To analyze the survey findings, the judgment matrices were compared, pair-wise, and 
calculated. The local priority weights of all main criteria and sub-criteria were first 
calculated, and then combined with all successive hierarchical levels in each matrix to obtain 
a global priority vector. The higher the mean weight of the global priority vector, the greater 
is the relative importance. This helps to distinguish the more important elements from the less 
important ones. 
Figure 3.5 shows the weight of the main criteria. Respondents reported that human 
factors (0.33) were the highest contributors to marine accidents in the Strait of Malacca, 
followed by ship condition (0.25), machinery factors (0.22), environmental factors (0.08) and 
navigational factors (0.12). 
The weights of sub criteria for ship condition are shown in Figure. 3.6. Respondents 
indicated that the type of ship (0.07) was the lowest contributing factor to marine accidents in 
the Strait of Malacca, while the speed of the ship and length (0.32) were the most important 
contributors to accidents in marine traffic safety. These were followed by the state of loading 
(0.29). 
The sub-criteria of human factors are shown in Figure. 3.7. In this figure, respondents 
indicated that experience (0.36) was the leading factor, followed by knowledge and skill 
(0.26), communication (0.21), fatigue (0.09), and over worked (0.08). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Weight of main criteria 
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Figure 3.6: Weight of ship condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Weight of human factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Weight of environmental factors 
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Figure 3.9: Weight of machinery factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Weight of navigational factors 
Figure 3.8 shows the weights of environmental factors. Distance between vessels 
(0.16) was continuously perceived as the most important sub-criteria of the environmental 
factors. This was followed by the ratio of ship draft to water depth (0.15), current influence 
(0.14), wind effect (0.12), speed difference compared with other ships (0.10), own ship 
course and course of other ships (0.10), characteristics of the area (0.08), influence upon the 
day of the week (0.06) and time zone (0.02). 
The failure of main engine and electrical sub-criterion (under the main criterion of 
`machinery factors`), in Figure. 3.9, was perceived as the most important (0.33). This was 
followed by failure of rudder (0.24), failure of navigation equipment (0.16), failure of 
lubricating oil (0.11), failure of propulsion (0.11), and failure of hull equipment (0.05). 
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As shown in Figure. 3.10, inappropriateness of crew manning (0.44) was indicated as 
the most important sub-criteria of the navigational factors. This was followed by 
inappropriateness ship operation regulation (0.32) and inappropriateness of navigation (0.24). 
Table 3.3 shows the indicator of ship condition. The type of ship indicator shows that 
LNG (0.17) were the most important, followed by VLCC(0.13), LPG (0.12), leisure(0.11), 
container ship (0.09), large passenger ship (0.09), ferry (0.08), bulk carrier (0.07), towing 
vessel (0.06), reefer ship(0.05) and PCC (0.04). 
Respondents reported that ship indicators of 250 m =< L< 300 m (0.2) and more than 
300 m (0.2) were the most important, followed by those of 200 m =< L < 250 m (0.14), 50 =< 
L <100 m (0.13), 150 m =< L < 200 m (0.13), less than 50 m (0.09), and those of 100 m =< L 
< 150 m (0.09). 
With regard to the speed of the ship, respondents indicated that values of 0–5 knots 
(0.02) were least important, followed by 6–10 knots (0.07), 11–15 knots (0.07), 16–20 knots 
(0.13), 21–25 knots (0.16), and over 26 knots (0.29). This shows that ship speeds over 26 
knots are the most important condition. In this condition, navigators must be careful to 
navigate the ship in the Strait of Malacca. Responses suggest that, for the state of loading 
indicator, ballast condition (0.23) is the most important, followed by full load (0.77). 
Table 3.3 and 3.4 show the value of each sub-criterion. The value is the function used 
to calculate the danger score. In Table 3.3, the criteria of ship condition consist of four 
sub-criteria, namely: type of ship, length of ship, speed of ship, and state of loading. In the 
sub criteria of type of ship in table 3.3, LNG is more important or has higher danger score 
than other ships. In this case, respondents considered that LNG has largest effect if accident 
occurred such us fire, explosion, etc. On the other hand, LNG vessel can be damaged because 
of an external impact for example: another vessel, floating objects, the sea floor, submerged 
objects, the quay or other structures. Concerning the sub-criteria related to the length of ship, 
the respondents considered that the ships with a length 300 m-more have a higher chance of 
danger than those of a smaller length. The ships with a speed exceeding, 26 knot are more 
important or have a higher danger score if navigators bring the ships passing through the 
Strait of Malacca, because the strait of Malacca is categorized as very busy shipping lane. In 
this case, navigators feel worried when transiting the Strait by high speed. In the state of 
loading, full-load condition is more important than the ballast condition the sub-criteria 
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related to ship condition, type of ship, length of ship, speed of ship and state of loading are 
separately considered during the analysis. 
 
Table 3.3: Ship condition indicators 
 
 
Sub Criteria Indicator/Function Weight Value
LNG 0.17 100
VLCC 0.13 76
LPG 0.12 71
Leisure 0.11 65
Container Ship 0.09 53
Large passanger ship 0.09 53
Ferry 0.08 47
Bulk carrier 0.07 41
Towing Vessels 0.06 35
Reefer ship 0.05 29
PCC 0.04 24
Less than 50 m 0.09 45
 50 =< L <100 m 0.09 45
100 m= <L <150 m 0.13 65
150 m =< L < 200 m    0.13 65
200 m =< L < 250 m 0.14 70
250 m =< L< 300 m 0.2 100
More than 300 m　　　　　　　            　　        　      　　      　　　 　     　 　0.2 100
Less than 5 k't 0.02 7
5 k't=<k't<10 k't 0.07 24
10 k't=<k't<15 k't 0.07 24
15 k't=<k't<20 k't 0.13 45
20 k't=<k't< 25 k't 0.16 55
More than 26 k't 0.29 100
Ballast 0.23 30
Full Load 0.77 100
SHIP CONDITION
Speed of Ship
State of 
Loading
Type of ship
Length of ship
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Table 3.4: Environmental indicators 
 
 
Sub-riteria Indicator / Function Weight Value
Less than 2.0 k't 0.12 22
2.0 k't=< k't<4.0 k't 0.33 60
More than 4.1 k't 0.55 100
Less than 1.0 k`t 0.4 100
1.0 k`t - 2.0 k`t 0.19 48
2.0 k`t - 3.0 k`t 0.18 45
3.0 k`t - 4.0 k`t 0.12 30
More than 4.1 k`t 0.11 28
Less than 50 m 0.08 38
 50 m=< L <100 m 0.11 52
100 m= <L <１50 m 0.12 57
150 m =< L < 200 m    0.14 67
200 m =< L < 250 m 0.17 81
250 m =< L< 300 m 0.17 81
More than 300 m　　　　　　　            　　        　      　　      　　　 　     　 　0.21 100
Ｈ/d＝1.1 - 1.2　Ram,full 0.14 78
H /d= 1.2 - 1.3 Ram, full　　　　　 　　
0.15 83
Ｈ/d＝1.3 - 1.5 　Ram,full　　　 　　 0.17 94
Ｈ/d＝1.5 - 1.7 　Ram,full　　　 0.18 100
Ｈ/d＝1.7 - 2.0　Ram,full　 0.18 100
Ｈ/d＝2.0 -  over　　　
0.18 100
Less than 5 L 0.24 100
5L =< L < 10 L 0.17 71
10L=< L < 15 L 0.16 67
15L=< L <20L 0.16 67
20L=< L <30L 0.14 58
More than 30L 0.13 54
Area A 0.26 100
Area B 0.21 84
Area C 0.25 96
area D 0.24 92
 0-4 0.2 100
 4-8 0.14 70
 8 - 12 0.13 65
 12-16 0.18 90
  16-20 0.2 100
 20-24 0.15 75
Monday 0.16 80
Tuesday 0.18 90
Wednesday 0.14 70
Thursday 0.09 45
Friday 0.2 100
Saturday 0.05 25
Sunday 0.07 35
Holiday 0.12 60
Heading of ship 0.31 100
Sharp turn 0.24 77
Narrow channel 0.31 100
Heavy traffic 0.14 45
 Wind effect Less than  10 k't 0.12 41
10 k't=<k't< 30 k't 0.16 55
30 k't=<k't< 50 k't 0.19 65
50 k't=<k't<70 k't 0.24 82
More than 70 k't 0.29 100
Characteristics of the area
Environmental factors
Influence of current
Speed difference compared 
with  other ship
Other vessel`s length 
Ratio of water depth to ship 
draft  
Distance between vessels
Ship course and course of 
other ships
Time zone
Influence upon the day of the 
week
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Table 3.4 shows the sub criteria related to the environmental factors. In this context, 
criteria of environmental factors consist of 10 sub-criteria. For the sub–criteria of influence of 
current, respondents argued that the 4.1 knots - over have a higher function value than others. 
In the sub-criteria: the differences of speed with encountered vessels, respondents agree that 
0, 0 knots – 0, 1 knot difference has a higher value of AHP function. Respondents considered 
that the smaller the difference in speed with other encountered ships is the more dangerous 
the navigation condition becomes. On the sub-criteria of length of the other ship, respondents 
adjusted that the difference of length over 300m has a higher danger score.  
Regarding the ratio of water depth to ship draft to, respondents indicated that values 
of H/d= 2.0-overare more important to be analyzed. In the sub-criteria of distance between 
vessels, the highest function is for the distance of 5L-less. Respondents agree that, if the 
distance between the ships is getting closer, then the hazard rate will be higher. Sub-criteria 
of ship course and course of other ships consists of area A, area B, area C and area D. Area A 
is area for head on of ship, area B and area D are (area) for crossing, and area C is (area) for 
overtaking. Respondent argues that the area A has a higher danger level than the area C, B 
and D. Sub-criteria of time zone, the times between 00.00h-04.00h and 16.00h-20.00h are 
considered more important than in the other times. In this case the respondents confirmed that 
during that time periods, the maritime traffic is considered to be the busiest. Considering the 
sub-criteria of upon the day of the week, Friday has a more important influence than any 
other days.  
 In the criteria of ship condition and environmental factors, danger score is 
established based on AIS data. It is calculated from static and dynamic data of the AIS data. 
Static data includes the type of ships, length of ships, speed of ships, IMO number, MMSI 
(Maritime Mobile Service Identity) number and call sign. Dynamic data includes the 
longitude, latitude, time, course, rate of turn, speed over ground, voyage-related information 
including the draft of the ship, destination, and type of cargo. In the environmental factors, 
the data related to current and wind is obtained from the Maritime and Port Authority of 
Singapore (MPA). 
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3.7  Danger Score Assessment  
 
AS shown in Figure. 3.4, the goal of the hierarchy structure is to determine the danger 
score. Five criteria are considered: ship condition, human factors, environmental factors, 
machinery factors and navigational factors.  
To assess the danger score, criteria of human factors, machinery factors and 
navigational factors could not be evaluated using AIS data. These criteria were determined 
from a series of questionnaire. The questionnaire was distributed among the navigators who 
have experienced passing through the Strait of Malacca.  
As a complex system with multiple subjects and multiple levels of ship safety 
navigation, an evaluation index of ship navigational safety was compiled to make the levels 
more certain and accurate using AIS data. The process of the assessment is as follows: 
At first, the weight of the evaluation index of each criteria (ship condition, human 
factors, environmental factors, machinery factors and navigational factors) and its related 
sub-criteria are established using AHP. Therefore, the value of the function of sub-sub-criteria 
is determined based on AIS data. The danger score is obtained by the sum of weight of the 
criteria and the sub-criteria multiplied by the corresponding sub-sub-criteria function values as 
shown in Eq. (3.6): 
 
DS =  ∑     
 
                      (3.6) 
          
where DS is the danger score index,   f” is the value of function of each index, obtained based 
on the weight of sub-sub- criteria in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. In this case, the function is obtained by 
dividing the largest value of the weights in each sub-criteria and multiplying  them 100 times 
on each index. w is the weight on each index, and n is the total number of indices, i = 
1,2,3,……..,n. 
The evaluation of danger score is divided into five danger areas: very low danger area, 
low danger area, middle danger area, high danger area and very danger area. Table 3.5 shows 
the division indexes of the established danger score in Strait of Malacca. 
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Table 3.5: Division indexes of danger score in Strait of Malacca 
Area Score range 
Very low danger (Safe 
condition) 
0-50 
Low danger (Safe condition) 50-100 
Middle danger  100-150 
High danger  150-200 
Very high danger  >200 
 
Below is the resulting calculation of the danger score for a tanker (subject ship A), container 
(subject ship B) and passenger (subject ship C) that passed through the Strait of Malacca on 
1/23/2010 at 16.00h. The ship data are given in Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3. 8. 
 
Table 3.6: Ship data of Pacific Lagoon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of ship Pacific Lagoon 
Ship Type Tanker 
LOA (m) 333 
DWT (t) 305839 
Speed (knot) 14.9 
Flag Belgium 
Year of build 1999 
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shows the subject ship A passing through this area for one hour between 16.00h and 17.00h. 
Ship tracking and danger score area for subject ship A are established based on AIS and GIS 
data. In this study, GIS is used to manage geographically and to visualize the vessel’s tracks 
obtained from the AIS data. In this study, using MySQL, AIS data is converted to GIS and can 
be visualized. A geographic information system is a modern information technique with 
powerful functions of storing, disposing, managing, analyzing, and displaying all forms of 
geographically referenced information. GIS also allows us to view, understand, interpret, and 
visualize data in many ways that reveal relationships, patterns, and trends in the form of maps, 
globes, reports, and charts. The danger score for the subject ship A is shown in Figure. 3.12, 
where the danger is the highest between 16.08.26 and 16.09.48. At that time, the ship is 
navigating in the main strait of the Strait of Malacca. Her speed is 14.9 knot sailing from the 
east gate to the west gate of the Strait of Malacca. The danger score of subject ship A which is 
higher than 200 is classified as a very high danger according to the division indexes of Table 
3.5.  In the subject ship A, the index of human factors are obtained from AHP and described in 
the criteria and sub-criteria as shown in Figures. 3.5 and 3.7. 
 
Table 3.7: Ship data of Maersk Line 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of ship Maersk Line 
Ship Type Container 
LOA (m) 352 
Total Tonnage (t) 109000 
Speed (knot) 19.1 
Flag Denmark 
Year of build 2003 
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Figure 3.16:  Danger score for subject ship C between 16.00h and 17.00h 
 
Table 3.8 shows the data for the passenger ship. Figure 3.15 shows the tracking and 
danger score of a passenger ship (will be here after referred as subject ship C) on 1/23/2010 at 
16.00h. The ellipse line in Fig. 3.15 shows the passenger ship course line passing through this 
area for one hour between 16.00h and 17.00h. The simulation results for the danger score of the 
passenger ship is shown in Fig. 3.16. The danger was the highest (more than 200) from 
16.17.07 to 16.17.24. During that period of time, the danger score of subject ship C is classified 
as a very high danger. The danger score between 16:32:17 and 16:44:27 is within the range 
150-200. This is considered as high danger. The middle danger with a value between 100 and 
150 was obtained from 16:18:25 to 16:27:35. Finally, the low danger occurred from 16:44:15 
to 16:52:24 and from 16:55:10 to 17:00:00 where the danger score was between 50 and 100. In 
the subject ship C, the index of human factors are obtained from AHP and described in the 
criteria and sub-criteria as shown in Figures. 3.5 and 3.7. 
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3.8 Conclusions 
 
 
This study presents an evaluation of marine safety in the Strait of Malacca based on the 
AIS data and AHP. Using the AHP, several factors that contribute to accidents in the Strait of 
Malacca were revealed. In the Strait of Malacca, from 1975 to 1995, a total of 496 casualties 
were recorded. These involved collisions, contacts, foundering, standings, fire, engine 
troubles, bilging and leakages. 35 of the 111 collision cases have caused foundering of the 
ships, led to fire and explosion or leakages leading to wrecks. An analysis of several factors 
that contribute to accidents in the Strait of Malacca indicates the following. First: Ship 
condition. In the ship condition, the following items are considered: type of ship, length of ship, 
speed of ship and state of loading. In the actual accident based on type of ship, General cargo 
ships are at the top the list at 53.15%, followed by tankers at 20.59%, bulk carriers at 6.72%, 
fishing craft at 4.41%, container ships at 2.94% and liquefied gas carriers at 1.68%. . Secondly, 
the human element is the most important factor. Several accidents occurred caused by human 
error. In this case, experience and knowledge, fatigue, overwork, communication are factors 
that are important for navigators. Thirdly, the environmental factors will be discussed. In fact, 
serious accidents have occurred in high traffic density areas. Current, speed other ships, length 
of other ships, distance between vessels, wind effect, characteristics of area are factors that 
have contributed to the accidents in the Strait of Malacca. Further on, the machinery factors are 
described. The high percentage of leaking ships and ships limping with machinery problems 
must be viewed with deep concern because such casualties can easily develop into or cause 
catastrophic accidents. In the machinery factors, failure of main engine and electrical power, 
failure of lubricating oil system, failure of navigation equipment, failure of rudder, failure of 
hull equipment and failure of propulsion should be considered. Finally, the navigational factors 
are discussed. This factor can contribute to the accident in the Strait of Malacca. 
Inappropriateness of ship operation regulation management, inappropriateness of crew 
manning, inappropriateness of navigational aid are important variable that should be evaluated 
in order to increase the navigational safety in the marine traffic.  
This research found an alternative way to assess the danger score of a vessel by 
considering a case study of vessel traffic in the Strait of Malacca. It was also found that AHP is 
considerably powerful in evaluating the weight of each criterion of the danger score. This was 
proved by the consistency ratio of all the criteria. The leading criteria that contribute to 
accidents in the Strait of Malacca are human factors. Based on AIS data, the ship population 
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passing through the strait on 1/23/2010 was calculated. The following type of ships were 
examined: tanker ships 37%, cargo ships 26%, tugs 9%, passenger ships 3%, towing and 
fishing ships 1%, other ships 10%, and unknown vessels 14%. 
In this research, an evaluation index of ship navigational safety was compiled to 
determine more certain and accurate levels using the AIS data. Figs. 3.11, 3.13, and 3.15 show 
the tracking of a tanker ship, container ship, and passenger ship, respectively, on 1/23/2010 at 
16.00h. The resulting danger scores including danger condition and safe condition are shown in 
Figures. 3.12, 3.14, and 3.16.  
Possible future works include analysis and assessment of collision avoidance in the 
Strait of Malacca. For this purpose, the closest point of approach (CPA) and time closest point 
of approach (TCPA) will be explored.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Risk Evaluation of Ship Collision 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
Safety of navigation has been focusing on issues of security, loss of lives and property. 
Moreover the concern for environmental protection and collision avoidance are growing 
significantly. An examination of the casualty data in the Malacca Straits between 1975 and 
1995 shown that serious accidents have occurred in high density traffic area [3]. 
The Malacca Strait that is located between the east coast of Sumatra Island in Indonesia 
and the west coast of the Peninsular Malaysia is linked with the Strait of Singapore at its 
south-east end. The Strait of Malacca is bordered on the north-west by a line starting from 
Ujung Baka (5°40’N, 95°26’E), north-west extremity of Sumatra, to Laem Phra Chao (7°45’N, 
98°18’E), south extremity of Koh Phuket Island, Thailand, and on the south-east by a line that 
starts from Tahan (Mount) Datok (1°20’E, 104°20’N) to Tanjung Pergam (1°10’E, 104°20’N) 
as shown in Figure 1.2. 
The channel of the Malacca Straits is connecting the Indian Ocean to the South China 
Sea. It lies between Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. It is 500 miles (800 km) long and is 
funnel-shaped; only 40 miles (65 km) wide in the south, it broadens in the north to 155 miles 
(249 km). Numerous islets hinder passage at its southern entrance creating the shortest sea 
route between India and China and one of the most heavily traveled shipping channels in the 
world. 
The implementation of an Automatic Identification System by the IMO in that area was 
done in order to enhance safety and efficiency of navigation, safety of life at sea, and to ensure 
the maritime environmental protection. In this study, an Automatic Identification System is 
implemented for the study of ship collision risk using fuzzy logic method under the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREG) guidelines. 
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Accordingly, the AIS is implemented as source of data and as input data for the hazard 
identification and risk evaluation using fuzzy logic method as a step of Formal Safety 
Assessment. 
In this research, the investigation of sea traffic using AIS data and GIS in the Malacca 
Straits is carried out. The proposed FMEA (failure mode effect analysis)-fuzzy method for the 
evaluation of ship collision risk is described. Finally, the risk evaluation results are discussed. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
Several researchers in the risk evaluation field have used fuzzy methods and FMEA. 
However, most object of previously used the fuzzy-FMEA method not for marine traffic and 
ship navigation issue. Wang et al. [11] discussed risk evaluation in failure mode by using the 
fuzzy weighted geometric mean. In their research, for ranking purposes, the fuzzy risk 
priority numbers (FRPNs) were defuzzified using a centroid defuzzification method in which 
a new centroid defuzzification formula based on alpha-level sets was derived. However, in 
that calculation did not appear to consider any countermeasure for the safety.  
Kentel et al. [12] analyzed probabilistic-fuzzy health risk modeling. They proposed 
a combination of fuzzy set theory with probability theory in order to incorporate uncertainties 
into the health risk analysis. They identified this approach as probabilistic-fuzzy risk 
assessment. However, in this paper did not consider the consequence for the risk. 
Karimi et al. [13] used a fuzzy method for determining a probabilistic earthquake risk 
assessment system. They outlined a risk assessment system for evaluating not only the 
expected structural damage but also the consequent financial losses and casualties due to a 
likely earthquake under conditions of elevated uncertainty; namely, for situations where 
neither the statistical data nor the seismological and engineering knowledge are sufficient for 
such an evaluation. The proposed approach has also been compared with an alternative 
approach for obtaining a fuzzy possibility-probability distribution. However, this research did 
not appear to consider the severity and detection to enhance the safety. 
Chin et al. [14] discussed the development of a fuzzy FMEA method based on a product 
design system. The proposed framework of this fuzzy FMEA method was based on 
approaches to the evaluation of new product concepts. They also carried out research with the 
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purpose of exploring the applicability of fuzzy logic and knowledge-based systems 
technologies to the competitive design and development of products today, with an emphasis 
on the design of high-quality products at the conceptual design stage. However, the 
countermeasures did not appear in this paper. The countermeasure is very important step to 
reduce the risk. 
Ung et al. [15] used fuzzy modeling in addition to failure mode, effects, and criticality 
analysis (FMECA) for assessment and management of port security risk, thus illustrating a 
different way of thinking about security assessment. However, the research did not analyze 
the condition in the ship navigation.  
Tesfamariam et al. [9] analyzed risk-based environmental decision making through 
a fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (F-AHP). Uncertainty of the vagueness type was 
considered using fuzzy-based techniques. The AHP was modified to a fuzzy AHP by using a 
fuzzy arithmetic operation. The F-AHP methodology integrated the attitude of the 
decision-maker as well as confidence in the final decision-making process. However, for 
more than one decision-maker, the problem becomes complex and the best solution is the one 
that will be accepted by all decision-makers. The F-AHP methodology can be extended to 
multi-expert MCDM. 
Tay et al. [16] proposed a generic method for simplifying the fuzzy-logic-based FMEA 
methodology by reducing the number of rules that an FMEA user needs to provide for the 
fuzzy risk priority number in the modeling process. In their research, the Gaussian 
membership function was implemented. 
In addition, several studies have investigated an automatic identification system. Mou et 
al. [7] used AIS data for analyzing ship collision avoidance in busy waterways. A statistical 
analysis of ship collisions was carried out. Only ships (own ships) that had an encounter in 
the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) for the Port of Rotterdam were taken into account. This 
paper did not appear to consider the human factors. Human factors are great factors that 
contribute the accident in the marine traffic area.  
Kobayashi et al. [1] proposed guidelines for evacuation of a ship in the event of 
a tsunami. However, AIS data was not used to analysis the risk in the marine traffic. In their 
study, AIS data were used for analyzing the behavior of ships navigating through Osaka Bay, 
Japan. 
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 Pitana et al. [2] analyzed the evacuation of a large passenger vessel in the case of 
a pending tsunami by using a discrete event simulation (DES) considering a stochastic 
approach. The AIS data were used for calculating the sea traffic in the research area. 
However, that calculation did not appear to consider the collision of ship and any accident 
during tsunami. 
Pan et al. (2012) established an AIS data visualization model for assessing the maritime 
traffic situation in Xiamen Bay and Meizhou Bay, China. However, the research did not show 
the combination the AIS with any method to evaluate the risk in the marine traffic. They 
proposed a new visualization model that can gauge the maritime traffic situation based on 
data from the automatic identification systems of ships.  
Zaman et al. (2013) used the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to analyze the 
implementation of the AIS in the Malacca Strait. In their study, a danger score assessment 
was established. The AHP is therefore used for evaluating the safety level in the Strait of 
Malacca. In this case, weighting factors are determined using the AHP. There are five 
evaluation criteria: the ship condition, human factor, environmental factor, machinery factor, 
and navigational factor. Each criterion divides into sub-criteria and then sub-sub-criteria. 
However, this research did not analyze risk probability, severity of risk and detection. The 
countermeasure also did not appear to consider for enhancing navigation safety in the 
Malacca Straits. 
The focus of this study is on identifying hazards and evaluating the marine navigation 
risk using fuzzy FMEA. In this case, the result of risk evaluation is useful to establish FSA 
for further. FSA is methodology which have recommended by IMO. By the fuzzy FMEA 
method, fuzzy risk priority numbers are obtained.  
The method proposes that fuzzy FMEA method is good in establishing the risk evaluation 
in the Malacca Straits based on AIS data. In this study, ten scenarios have been established on 
the basis of AIS data, other data sources, and the GIS. Aspects such as ship type, ship 
condition, regional characteristics, and distance between vessels were classified on the basis 
of AIS data and the GIS. Therefore, a questionnaire was conducted with navigators that had 
experienced navigation through the Malacca Strait.  
 In this method, linguistic variable such as the occurrence, severity, and detection as risk 
factors in the FMEA can be represented as members of fuzzy set, described using linguistic 
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priority terms associated with corresponding membership values (fuzzy inputs) and combined 
by matching rules in rule base. The outcome of such a combination is referred to as a set of 
fuzzy conclusions. By the deffuzification taking into account the consequent membership 
functions, the risk level of an event in terms of deffuzzified value can be realized. Lists of 
risk priority of those events are then developed based on deffuzification. Fuzzy risk priority 
numbers are determined for each scenario. 
The actual sea traffic conditions and the ship collision analysis are established using AIS 
data provided by a receiving system installed at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia.  
 
4.3 AIS Data Processing and Collection 
 
4.3.1 Data Source and AIS Installation 
 
 
The AIS is an information and communication system that utilizes maritime VHF 
frequencies to send and receive data between two suitably equipped vessels and between 
suitably equipped vessels and shore stations. The information communicated includes data 
directly associated with navigation such as the vessels identity, position, speed and course and 
other information in a message format. The IMO added a new requirement (as part of a revision 
to Chapter V) for all ships to carry an AIS System capable of providing information about the 
ship to other ships and to coastal authorities automatically.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, AIS information includes static, dynamic, and 
voyage-related elements. Static information is programmed into the unit at the time of 
commissioning. Dynamic information is derived from interfaces such as ship’s GPS and other 
sensors. Voyage-related data are entered manually by the ship's captain using a 
password-protected routine. 
Through dedicated VHF frequencies, AIS information is transmitted between vessels, 
from vessels to shore, or vice versa. In simple terms, AIS is a technology which makes ships 
visible to each other. As an aid to collision avoidance, it records the information of ship 
behavior, including the effects of human action and ship maneuverability. The information 
includes the vessel’s name, its particulars, ship type, registration numbers, and destination as 
well as the vessel’s position, speed, and heading. 
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Figure 4.2: Selected research area (dotted box) based on AIS data 
 The analysis results related to the number of ships in June 2010 are shown in Figs. 
2.4-2.10 in Chapter 2. 
Based on the AIS data investigation that was shown in Figures 2.4-2.10, the analysis 
of ship encounter situations has been established. The AIS data analysis is also useful for 
analyzing the traffic density, the ship’s collision probability and the dangerous area for 
navigation. In this paper, the analysis of AIS data is required in order to evaluate the ship’s 
collision risk in the Malacca Straits. The scenarios of ship’s collision are identified. The 
analysis of ship’s collision scenarios will be deeper explained in the next sections. 
 
4.4 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
4.4.1 The FMEA Procedure 
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is a widely used engineering technique for 
defining, identifying, and eliminating the known or potential failures, problems, and errors in 
a system, design, process, or service before this reaches the customer. The failure mode is 
defined as the manner in which a component, system, subsystem, or process could potentially 
fail to meet the design intent. A failure mode in one component can be the cause of a failure 
mode in another component. A failure cause is defined as a design weakness that may result 
N 
W E 
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in a failure. For each failure mode identified, the ultimate effects need to be determined, 
usually by an FMEA team. A failure effect is defined as the result that a failure mode has in 
the function of the product or process as perceived by customer. A system, design, process, or 
service can usually have multiple failure modes, causes, and effects. In this situation, each 
failure mode or cause needs to be assessed and prioritized in terms of its risks so that 
high-risk (the most dangerous) failure modes can be corrected with top priority. The 
traditional FMEA determines the risk priorities of failure modes through the risk priority 
number (RPN), which is the product of the occurrence (O), severity (S), and detection (D) of 
a failure. That is,  
RPN = O × S × D                         (1) 
Occurrence is defined as the likelihood that a specific cause or mechanism will arise. Severity 
is an assessment of the effect of a potential failure mode on the next component, subsystem, 
or customer. Detection is an assessment of the ability of a current design control to detect a 
potential cause or mechanism. In general, these three factors are estimated by experts using a 
scale from 1 to 10 based on the commonly agreed evaluation criteria described in Tables 
4.1–4.3. As the RPN is a measure of the risk of each failure, it can be used to rank failures 
and prioritize actions. The failure modes with higher RPNs are assumed to be more important 
and will be given higher priorities for correction. 
Table 4.1:   Crisp rating for occurrence of a failure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rating Probability of occurrence Failure probability 
9–10 Very High: failure is almost inevitable > 1 in 2 1 in 3 
7–8 High: repeated failures 
1 in 8 
1 in 20 
4–6 Moderate: occasional failure 
1 in 80 
1 in 400 
1 in 2000 
2–3 Low: relatively few failures 
1 in 15,000 
1 in 150,000 
1 Remote: failure is unlikely < 1 in 1,500,000 
54 
 
Table 4.2:  Crisp rating for severity of a failure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3:  Crisp rating for detection of a failure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rating Effect Severity of effect 
9–10 Very High Ship collision has a very serious effect on people, sea traffic, and 
environment 
7–8 High 
Ship collision has a serious 
effect on people, sea traffic, and 
environment 
4–6 Moderate 
Ship collision has a moderately 
serious effect on people, sea 
traffic, and environment 
2–3 Low 
Ship collision has little serious 
effect on people, sea traffic, and 
environment 
1 Remote 
Ship collision has no serious 
effect on people, sea traffic, and 
environment 
Rating Detection Likelihood of detection 
9–10 Remote 
Remote chance that the design 
control  will detect potential cause 
or mechanism and subsequent failure 
mode 
7–8 Low 
Low chance that the design control 
will detect potential cause or 
mechanism and subsequent failure 
mode 
5–6 Moderate 
Moderate chance that the design 
control  will detect potential cause 
or mechanism and subsequent failure 
mode 
3–4 High 
High chance that the design control 
will detect potential cause or 
mechanism and subsequent failure 
mode 
1–2 Very High 
Very high chance that the design 
control will detect potential cause or 
mechanism and subsequent failure 
mode 
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4.4.2 FMEA for Marine Traffic Areas 
FMEA was first adopted as a formal design methodology in the 1960s by the aerospace 
industry seeking to enhance the levels of safety and reliability (Sankar and Prabju, 2000). 
Since then, it has been applied in many industries to ensure the safety and reliability of 
products. Usually FMEA is applied to identify the potential failure modes of the system and 
evaluate their impact on each system component.  
The focus of this research is on hazard identification as the first step of an FSA of the 
Malacca Strait. The aim of this step is to identify the hazards of a specific problematic area 
and list these according to the likelihood of occurrence and the severity of the consequences 
for marine traffic in terms of human life, property, and the environment. This first step 
provides the basis or the reference point for the next step.  
There are several methods for hazard identification and risk evaluation, such as fault tree 
analysis  (FTA), event tree analysis (ETA), and FMEA. In this research, an FMEA based on 
AIS data is used as a method of hazard identification and risk evaluation for ship collisions in 
the Malacca Strait. This is because it has several advantages: 
 The Malacca Strait is categorized as a high-risk area for navigation. It is very 
important to enhance the navigational safety. In this case, FMEA is a good method for 
evaluating the risk and identifying the collision hazards for ships. FMEA can be used 
for defining, identifying, and eliminating the known or potential failures, problems, 
and errors for navigational activities in the Malacca Strait. 
 FMEA determines the risk priorities of failure modes through the risk priority number 
(RPN), which is the product of the occurrence, severity, and detection. Those risk 
factors are very applicable to marine traffic safety and ship navigation. 
 The three risk factors (occurrence, detection, and severity) are evaluated using the 
10-point scales described in Tables 4.1–4.3. This condition is useful in conducting 
marine traffic and in ship navigation. 
In this study, a fuzzy FMEA is performed to evaluate the risk of ship collisions in the 
Malacca Strait. This is because for several reasons FMEA has proven to be one of the more 
important early preventive actions in a process that will prevent failures and errors. However, 
the crisp RPN has been severely criticized for a variety of reasons. Significant criticisms 
include the following: 
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 Different combinations of O, S, and D may produce exactly the same value of RPN, 
but the hidden risk implications may be totally different.  
 The relative importance among O, S, and D is not taken into consideration. The three 
risk factors are assumed to be equally important. This may not be the case when 
considering a practical application of FMEA. 
 The three factors are difficult to estimate precisely. Much of the information in FMEA 
can be expressed linguistically in terms such as moderate, high, or very high. 
To overcome the above disadvantages, fuzzy logic has been widely applied in FMEA. This 
will be explored in the next section. 
 
4.5 The Proposed Model Using Fuzzy FMEA  
 
The traditional FMEA determines the risk priorities of failure modes by using criteria 
such as occurrence, severity, and detection. In this study, the criteria O, S, and D are applied 
to determine the risk ranking based on the min-max approach. 
Figure 4.3 shows the framework of the fuzzy FMEA procedure. A preliminary analysis of 
the AIS data on the Malacca Strait was carried out. 
The data received by the AIS are classified as static data, dynamic data, or voyage-related 
data. The static data of the vessel include the name, radio call sign, Maritime Mobile Service 
Identity (MMSI), length, beam, ship type, and antenna location. The dynamic data include the 
current location, time, navigational speed, and direction. The voyage-related data include the 
draft, destinations, and estimated times of arrival. 
Moreover, a ship collision classification based on both statistical data and the AIS data 
has been carried out. Subsequently, all potential failure modes of each process and the causes 
of each failure mode are determined. Furthermore, the detection process is established. 
Design of the membership function for the linguistic priority term has also been carried 
out. The input membership functions are classified as follows: severity membership function, 
occurrence membership function, and detection membership function. The last steps of the 
framework are related to the development of a fuzzy rules base, the fuzzy conclusions for 
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each scenario, and the defuzzification process. These steps are taken in order to obtain the 
risk ranking from which the risk scenario ranking can be obtained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Framework of fuzzy FMEA procedure 
 
In the proposed method, the fuzzification process uses a singleton method to map the 
crisp point into a fuzzy set, and the fuzzy set rules base is a collection of fuzzy if-then rules. 
The fuzzy inference engine performs a mapping from the fuzzy sets on the basis of the fuzzy 
if-then rules in the fuzzy rules base and the compositional rules of inference. In the 
defuzzifier, the weighted mean of maximums (WMoM) is used for calculating a crisp output 
from the system. The input linguistic variables are created by means of FMEA. Explicitly, 
these are occurrence, severity, and detection. Figure 4.4 shows the risk evaluation process 
using fuzzy modeling. The risk ranking is determined by the WMoM method as follows: 
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where  wi is the degree of truth of the membership function of the ith linguistic priority term 
and xi is the risk rank at the maximum value of the membership function of the ith linguistic 
priority term. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Risk evaluation using fuzzy modeling 
 
4.5.1 Establishment of Membership Function 
A fuzzy set is a collection of elements in a universe of information where the boundary of 
the set is ambiguous, vague, and otherwise fuzzy. It is specified by a membership function, 
which assigns a value within the unit interval [0, 1] to each element in the universe of 
discourse.  
The assigned value is called the membership degree, which specifies the extent to which 
a given element belongs to the fuzzy set. If the assigned value is zero, the given element does 
not belong to the set. If the assigned value is unity, the element fully belongs to the set. If the 
value lies within the interval [0,1], the element partially belongs to the set. Therefore, any 
fuzzy set can be uniquely determined from its membership function.   
There are various types of fuzzy numbers and its nomenclature is associated with its 
format, such as: sine numbers, bell shape, polygonal, trapezoids, triangular, and so on. The 
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function itself can be an arbitrary curve whose shape we can define as a function that suits us 
from the point of view of simplicity, convenience, speed, and efficiency.  
In fuzzy FMEA, the three input factors of the RPN function, i.e. occurrence, severity, and 
detection are assumed to be the input factors of the fuzzy RPN function as well. In this paper 
the triangular fuzzy numbers are established. The triangular membership function is used to 
represent each linguistic term. It is chosen because the simplest is the triangular membership 
function and the simplest membership functions are formed using straight lines. This function 
is nothing more than a collection of three points forming a triangle.  
The triangular is also adopted since it has a smooth transition from one linguistic priority 
term to another. It facilitates also easy defuzzification of each linguistic priority term. 
The membership function for each linguistic priority term is evaluated within its limits on an 
arbitrary scale from zero to unity. 
Besides, past experiences have indicated that it is a suitable choice in many applications, 
and has been a reliable performer including fuzzy controllers, fuzzy models, and 
classification schemes. Perhaps, the most obvious motivation behind their utilization stems 
from a striking simplicity of this form of the membership functions (that could be eventually 
exploited in further steps of processing) and a fairly limited availability of the pertinent 
information about the linguistic terms. 
The most commonly used fuzzy numbers are triangular fuzzy number, whose 
membership function is defined as: 
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The triangular membership function is denoted as (a,b,c). 
In this study, by using triangular, five membership functions were established. Then, five 
linguistic priority terms were employed to describe the linguistic variables of each scenario 
and their interpretations (occurrence, severity, and detection) are provided in Tables 1–3. The 
output of this analysis is that each element of a scenario has at least one membership function 
value associated with one linguistic priority term. 
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4.5.2 Fuzzy Rules Base and Defuzzification Process  
A fuzzy rules base is collection of knowledge from experts. A fuzzy if-then rule is an 
if-then statement in which some words are characterized by a continuous membership 
function. It provides a systematic procedure for transforming a knowledge base into a 
nonlinear mapping. The priority level of specific scenario is decided on the basic of the fuzzy 
rule base developed. In this paper, “min-max Approach” or Mamdani method is established. 
It is chosen because the most widely used rule of inference is the min-max one. This was 
originally proposed by E. H. Mamdani who based it on ideas of L. A. Zadeh presented. The 
Mamdani method (min-max) is also widely accepted for capturing expert knowledge. It 
allows us to describe the expertise in more intuitive, more humanlike manner. Besides, The 
Mamdani FIS has output membership functions which are used in this paper. Past 
experiences also have indicated that Mamdani method is a suitable choice in many 
applications and in the safety issue. 
The other method is Sugeno method. Sugeno method is computationally efficient and 
works well with optimization and adaptive techniques, which makes it very attractive in 
control problems, particularly for dynamic non linear systems. These adaptive techniques can 
be used to customize the membership functions so that fuzzy system best models the data. 
However, Sugeno FIS has no output membership functions. In this paper, output membership 
function is established to make fuzzy conclusions. This method is not suitable for this 
research, because this research needs output membership function in fuzzy inference system. 
By using “min-max” approach, the set of fuzzy conclusions of the scenario is obtained in 
terms of membership function values associated with linguistic priority terms. In this case, 
“min-max” approach is established to make easy to associate with deffuzification process. 
When applying the “min-max” approach, the following steps are conducted: 
 Identify the possible combination of O, S, and D in which the membership values 
associated with the corresponding linguistic priority terms are not zero. The outputs of 
such combinations can be obtained from the fuzzy rule base developed. 
 Determine the minimum value of each combination by comparing the values obtained 
from each element and the value of the belief degree established in the priority level. 
 Determine the highest minimum values obtained from step 2 with respect to each 
linguistic priority term. 
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There are three approaches that used in the fuzzy inference system in Mamdani method 
which are some of the most commonly used aggregation operators are the maximum, the sum 
and the probabilistic sum. In this study, the maximum is used. In the sum method, the fuzzy 
conclusion is obtained by determine bounded-sum to all output of fuzzy. That is different 
with probabilistic OR method. In this method, the implication is obtained by conduct product 
to all output of fuzzy. 
The deffuzification process creates a crisp ranking from the fuzzy conclusion set to 
express the riskiness of the design so that corrective actions and design revision can be 
prioritized. The deffuzification process is required to decipher the meaning of the fuzzy 
concussions and their membership values, and resolve conflicts between different results, 
which may have been triggered during the rule evaluation (Chin et al, 2008)  
In the case of defuzzification to determine a failure mode critically ranking, the 
defuzzification strategy should result in continuous range of critically rankings, and consider 
all of the rules fired during the rule evaluation according to the degree of truth of the 
conclusion.  Several defuzzification algorithms have been developed, there are; (a) Centroid 
average (CA). Centroid defuzzification returns the center of area under the curve. If we think 
of the area as a plate of equal density, the centroid is the point along the x axis about which 
this shape would balance. (b) Bisector. The bisector is the vertical line that will divide the 
region into two sub-regions of equal area. It is sometimes, but not always coincident with the 
centroid line. (c) Mean of maximum (MOM), (d) Smallest of maximum (SOM) and (e) Largest 
of maximum (LOM). MOM, SOM, and LOM stand for Middle, Smallest, and Largest of 
Maximum, respectively. These three methods key of the maximum value assumed by the 
aggregate membership function. 
In Mamdani  method there are several ways to defuzzify this kind of aggregated 
areas  but the two most popular are the mean of maximum  and centroid average. The one 
selected for use in this study is the MOM or WMoM. That method is chosen because 
“min-max” method was established in the fuzzy conclusion, and one of the variable values at 
which the fuzzy subset has its maximum truth value is chosen as the crisp value for the output 
variable. 
The WMoM method is also appear the algorithm averages the points of maximum 
possibility for each priority level of the scenarios, weighted by the degrees of truth at which 
62 
 
the membership functions reach the maximum values. The defuzzification value can be 
determined as shown in Equation 2. 
4.6. Risk Evaluation for FSA 
4.6. 1 Formal Safety Assessment 
According to the IMO, an FSA is a rational and systematic process for assessing the risks 
associated with any sphere of activity and for evaluating the costs and benefits of different 
options for reducing those risks. The FSA is also a systematic, formal, and integrated 
assessment approach. The application of this method to maritime safety and navigation 
consists of a five-step FSA procedure that establishes an overall analysis. The FSA approach 
is a standardized holistic approach in risk assessment. The approach involves several standard 
elements, which are illustrated by the five-step procedure shown in Figure 4.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: The five-step procedure of the FSA 
 
 
 Hazard identification 
Risk assessment 
Establishment of safety 
measure 
Cost-benefit assessment 
Recommendation for 
decision-making 
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Table 4.4:    Percentage of casualty occurrences for each ship type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of vessel Number Percentage 
General cargo 253 53.15% 
Tanker 98 20.59% 
Bulk carrier 32 6.57% 
Fishing 21 4.41% 
Container 14 2.94% 
Liquefied gas 
tanker 8 1.68% 
Tug 7 1.49% 
Ore carrier 6 1.26% 
Ferry 3 0.63% 
Landing craft 3 0.63% 
Passenger 3 0.63% 
Roro cargo 3 0.63% 
Supply ship 3 0.63% 
Tug or Supply ship 3 0.63% 
Vehicle carrier 3 0.63% 
Livestock carrier 2 0.42% 
Aggregate carrier 1 0.21% 
Barge carrier 1 0.21% 
Cable layer 1 0.21% 
Crane pontoon 1 0.21% 
Destroyer 1 0.21% 
Drilling ship 1 0.21% 
Hopper dredge 1 0.21% 
Processing tanker 1 0.21% 
Refrigerated cargo 1 0.21% 
Utility vessel 1 0.21% 
Unknown 4 0.84% 
TOTAL 476  
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The five-step FSA procedure includes the following: hazard identification, risk 
assessment, establishment of safety measures, cost-benefit assessment, and recommendations 
for decision-making. FSA is a tool designed to assist maritime regulators in the process of 
improving and deriving new rules and regulations. It is also a powerful tool in helping to 
evaluate navigational risks. This study focuses on hazard identification as the first step of an 
FSA. In this step, the criteria for the risk factors are obtained from a failure mode and effects 
analysis. The criteria are determined from three risk factors: occurrence, severity, and 
detection. The risk factors O, S, and D are set as fuzzy variables and are later evaluated using 
a fuzzy method. 
 
4.6. 2 Ship Casualties in the Malacca Strait 
Hazard identification for ships in the Malacca Strait is an essential part of the risk 
assessment process. A list of relevant hazards that occurred in the Malacca Strait was 
established. Table 4.4 lists statistical data based on the casualties reported for different types 
of vessels in the Malacca Strait between 1978 and 1994 (Gran, 1999). 
It can be observed from the table above that most of the casualties occurred for general 
cargo ships (53.15%), followed by tankers (20.59%). Table 4.5 lists the statistical data on the 
types of casualties that occurred in the Malacca Strait between 1978 and 1994 (Gran, 1999). 
The categories of the vessel-related casualties in the Malacca Strait are as follows: 1) fire or 
explosion, 2) stranding or grounding, 3) leaking or engine trouble, 4) collision, and 5) other. 
Table 4.5 shows that 101 collisions occurred between 1978 and 1994, representing 21% of 
the casualties in that period. The analysis of the number of collisions in the Malacca Strait is 
an important issue. Implementation of the AIS was very important for enhancing the 
navigational safety. In addition to static information, the AIS provides accurate real-time 
dynamic information about the navigating ships. It yields an important database that can be 
used in decision-making and management for collision avoidance. 
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Table 4.5:  Types of casualties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7 Fuzzy Model for Risk Evaluation 
4.7.1 Establishment of Scenarios and Risk Priority Numbers (RPNs) 
To create the FMEA model, 10 scenarios were established on the basis of AIS data and 
previously recorded data. These hypothetical scenarios will be explored. Scenarios are 
created to determine values of RPN and to serve as the scope (or domain) in the fuzzy logic 
method. In the fuzzy FMEA, the value of the membership function ranges between zero and 
unity. Figures 4.6–4.9 show the risk assessment made using fuzzy FMEA modeling for ship 
collisions in the Malacca Strait. The three risk factors are described and evaluated in Tables 
4.7–4.9. The failure modes with higher risk rankings are assumed to be more important and 
will be given higher priorities for correction. 
Ten scenarios have been established on the basis of AIS data, other data sources, and the 
GIS. First, aspects such as ship type, ship condition, regional characteristics, and distance 
between vessels were classified on the basis of AIS data and the GIS. Therefore, a 
questionnaire was conducted with navigators that had experienced navigation through the 
Malacca Strait. The scenarios were also based on previous literature related to the safety of 
navigation in the Malacca Strait. The hypothetical scenarios and resultant RPN values are 
listed in Table 4.6.  
Once the 10 scenarios were defined, another questionnaire was distributed to the 
navigators and crew members that had experienced navigation through the Malacca Strait. 
The total number of navigators was 41. The content of the questionnaire was classified using 
Type of casualty Number Percentage 
Fire or Explosion 183 17% 
Grounding or Stranding 153 32% 
Leaking or Engine 
trouble 123 26% 
Collision 101 21% 
Other 81 4% 
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FMEA methodology. In this case, the questionnaire was conducted on potential failures, 
potential effects of failures, potential causes of failures, and current control of failures. The 
scale of the questionnaire was 1–10, which matched the scale of the FMEA method. A 
classification weight was assigned to each group of navigators according to the extent of their 
navigational experience: 5–10 years (0.2), 10–15 years (0.3), and 15 or more years (0.5). The 
following formula was applied to obtain the average values of the responses: 
 
 ̅     ∑
  
 
           
 
   
(4) 
 
where    is the value of the response and n is the number of respondents. 
The formula for determining the questionnaire score was as follows: 
 
 
       ̅                    ( ) 
 
where       is the questionnaire score,  ̅     is the average value of the responses for each 
criterion (occurrence, severity, or detection), and    is the weight of the expert judgment 
(based on the experience of the navigator). 
The scores of the questionnaires are values of O, S, and D that are then used as input to 
obtain the membership function value for each criterion. RPN values were calculated using 
Equation 1. Results for RPN are listed in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6:    RPN values 
 
4.7.2 Establishment of Membership Function  
The membership function is established for linguistic priority terms with linguistic 
variables O, S, and D as shown in Figures 4.6–4.8. The descriptions are detailed in Tables 
4.8–4.10. 
The membership function value is between zero and unity. The interpretation of the 
descriptive terms for occurrence and severity is as follows: remote (R), low (L), moderate 
(M), high (H), and very high (VH). The linguistic priority terms for detection are plotted in 
the direction opposite to that for occurrence and severity by starting from very high and 
ending with remote. The risk factors are evaluated using the 10-point scale that divides them 
into bins labeled very high, high, moderate, low, and remote.  
An example of determining the input membership function value for the first of the 
previously defined hypothetical scenarios is shown in Figures 4.6–4.8. The values for the 
other nine scenarios can be obtained in a similar way as shown in Figures 4.6–4.8. 
 
Scenario Process steps Occurrence Severity Detection RPN RPN Rank
1 High traffic density 8.19 7.91 7.47 483.928263 9
2
Short distance between 
vessels
8.28 8.04 7.64 508.603968 8
3
Speeds of own ship and 
target ship
7.86 7.65 7.86 472.61394 10
4 Danger in head on situation 
and Human Error
9.05 8.95 8.83 715.207925 4
5 Danger in overtaking 
situation and Human Error
9.11 9.02 8.83 725.580526 3
6 Danger in crossing situation 
and Human Error
9.07 9.29 8.88 748.231464 2
7
Error of navigation and 
Human Error
8.31 8.26 8.34 572.462604 5
8
Failure of machinery and 
electricty system
8.16 8.18 8.16 544.670208 7
9
Bad weather conditions
8.38 8.38 7.9 554.77276 6
10 Human error in General 9.6 9.56 9.27 850.76352 1
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Table 4.7:    Interpretation of the linguistic priority term for probability of occurrence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Fuzzy membership functions for linguistic variables reflecting probability of 
occurrence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linguistic 
priority term Interpretation 
Fuzzy 
numbers 
Very High Failure is almost inevitable (7.5, 10, 10) 
High Repeated failures (5, 7.5, 10) 
Moderate Occasional failure (2.5, 5, 7.5) 
Low Relatively few failures (0, 2.5, 5) 
Remote Failure is unlikely (0, 0, 2.5) 
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Table 4.8:    Interpretation of the linguistic priority term for severity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Fuzzy membership functions for linguistic variables reflecting severity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linguistic 
priority 
term 
Interpretation Fuzzy numbers 
Very High Ship collision has a very serious effect on people, sea 
traffic, and the environment 
(7.5, 10, 10) 
High 
Ship collision has a serious 
effect on people, sea traffic, 
and the environment 
(5, 7.5, 10) 
Moderate 
Ship collision has a 
moderately serious effect on 
people, sea traffic, and the 
environment 
(2.5, 5, 7.5) 
Low 
Ship collision has a minor 
effect on people, sea traffic, 
and the environment 
(0, 2.5, 5) 
Remote 
Ship collision has no serious 
effect on people, sea traffic, 
and the environment 
(0, 0, 2.5) 
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Table 4.9:  Interpretation of the linguistic priority term for detection 
 
Linguistic 
priority term Interpretation Fuzzy numbers 
Remote 
Remote chance that 
the AIS and navigation 
system will detect 
potential cause or 
mechanism and 
subsequent failure mode 
(7.5, 10, 10) 
Low 
Low chance that the AIS 
and navigation system 
will detect potential cause 
or mechanism and 
subsequent failure mode 
(5, 7.5, 10) 
Moderate 
Moderate chance that the 
AIS and navigation 
system will detect 
potential cause or 
mechanism and 
subsequent failure mode 
(2.5, 5, 7.5) 
High 
High chance that the AIS 
and navigation system 
will detect potential cause 
or mechanism and 
subsequent failure mode 
(0, 2.5, 5) 
Very High 
Very high chance that the 
AIS and navigation 
system will detect 
potential cause or 
mechanism and 
subsequent failure mode 
(0, 0, 2.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4.8: Fuzzy membership functions for linguistic variables reflecting detection 
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Table 4.10:    Interpretation of the linguistic priority term for priority level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9:  Fuzzy membership functions for linguistic variables reflecting priority level 
 
  
 
Linguistic 
priority 
term 
Interpretation Fuzzy numbers 
Very High Very high risk level for ship collision scenario (7, 8.5, 10) 
High High risk level for ship collision scenario (5.5, 7, 8.5) 
Moderate Moderate risk level for ship collision scenario (3, 5, 7) 
Low Low risk level for ship collision scenario (1.5, 3, 4.5) 
Remote Remote risk level for ship collision scenario (0, 1.5, 3) 
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4.7.3 Establishment of Fuzzy Rule and Conclusions  
Figure 4.9 shows the membership function of the output that is called the priority level. In 
this study, the output takes five membership function values: remote (1), low (2), moderate 
(3), high (4), and very high (5), as described in Table 10.  
In order to obtain a security risk ranking, two steps are required. First, the linguistic 
priority terms and the associated membership values reflecting the risk levels for the O, S, 
and D of each scenario are carefully decided. Second, the fuzzy set conclusion of each 
scenario is obtained from the fuzzy rules base using the so-called min-max approach. Hence, 
the fuzzy set conclusions of Scenario 1 are obtained as follows: 
 List the membership function values. The combinations of membership function values 
for Scenario 1 are shown below. In a similar way, the combinations of membership 
function values for other scenarios can be produced. 
 If O = High 0.76, P = High 0.84, and D = Moderate 0.96, then the priority level 
is 1 High. 
 If O = High 0.76, P = High 0.84, and D = Low 0.96, then the priority level 
is 1 Very High. 
 If O = Very High 0.24, P = High 0.84, and D = Moderate 0.96, then the priority 
level is 0.7 High. 
 If O = Very High 0.24, P = High 0.84, and D = Low 0.04, then the priority level 
is 0.2 Very High. 
 If O = High 0.76, P = Very High 0.16, and D = Moderate 0.96, then the priority 
level is 0.8 High. 
 If O = High 0.76, P = Very High 0.84, and D = Low 0.04, then the priority level 
is 0.5 Very High. 
 If O = Very High 0.24, P = High 0.16, and D = Moderate 0.96, then the priority 
level is 1 High. 
 If O = Very High 0.24, P = High 0.16, and D = Low 0.96, then the priority level 
is 0.5 Very High. 
 Determine the minimum value of each combination by comparing the values obtained 
from each element and the weight established for the priority level.  In the first 
combination shown above, O = High 0.76, S = High 0.84, D = moderate 0.96, and the 
priority level is High. Therefore, the minimum value of O, S, and D is 0.76. The 
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minimum values of the other combinations can be determined in a similar way. 
 Determine the maximum value of the minimum values obtained from the previous step. 
This can be done for two categories: High and Very High. The maximum value of the 
linguistic priority High is 0.76, and the maximum value of the linguistic priority Very 
High is 0.04. Table 12 lists these maximum values. The maximum values are used for 
calculating the fuzzy risk ranking based on Equation 2. 
 
The fuzzy set conclusions of the other scenarios can be obtained in a similar way. 
Table 4.11:  Maximums of minimums for Scenario 1 
 
 
 
4. 8 Collision Risk Ranking 
 
Based on Equation 2, the defuzzified values of all scenarios were calculated and then 
plotted as shown in Figure 4.10. By using Equation 1 in the defuzzification process and 
taking into account the risk rank at the maximum values of the membership function, the 
defuzzified value of Scenario 1 can be expressed as follows: 
 
     
∑    
∑  
 
                      
          
               (6) 
 
The defuzzified values of all other scenarios are obtained in a similar way. 
The scenarios with higher defuzzified values are considered to be more risky. Human 
error has the highest risk ranking. It is followed in rank by crossing situation, head-on 
situation, short distance between vessels, speeds of own ship and target ship, high traffic 
density, overtaking situation, error in navigation, bad weather conditions, and failure of 
machinery or electrical system. This result, called the fuzzy risk ranking, is very important in 
Category Maximum value 
High 0.76 
Very High 0.04 
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that it gives useful information to navigators passing through the Malacca Strait. It is useful 
for navigators seeking to prevent accidents and reduce the ship collision risk in the Malacca 
Strait. Additionally, by improving this approach, important risk factors can be identified and 
thoroughly analyzed in further studies. 
 
Figure 4.10: Fuzzy risk priority numbers for ship collisions. 
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Scenario Process steps FRPN FRPN Rank Countermeasure
1
High traffic 
density
7.08 7
Development of marine traffict 
management
2 Short distance 
between vessels
7.42 5
Use of detection and monitoring 
system
3
Speeds of own 
ship and target 
ship
7.18 6
Development of control system of 
navigation
4
Danger in head 
on situation and 
Human Error
7.72 3 Improvement of skill of navigation
5
Danger in 
overtaking 
situation and 
Human Error
6.14 8 Improvement of skill of navigation
6
Danger in 
crossing 
situation and 
Human Error
7.97 2 Improvement of skill of navigation
7
Error of 
navigation and 
Human Error
7.48 4
Establishment of ability of crew 
manning
8
Failure of 
machinery and 
electricty system
5.56 10
Development of reliability and 
maintenance system
9
Bad weather 
conditions
5.64 9 Use of communication system 
10
Human error in 
General 8.12 1 Improvement of skill of navigation
Table 4.12:  Fuzzy risk priority numbers and countermeasures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.9 Conclusions  
This paper has proposed an evaluation of ship collisions in the Malacca Strait on the basis 
of fuzzy knowledge. In this study, the AIS was implemented as a source of input data for a 
fuzzy logic method that performed both hazard identification and risk assessment as steps of 
a formal safety assessment. By using a fuzzy FMEA, risk evaluations for ship collisions in 
the Malacca Strait were conducted. The fuzzy FMEA considered three risk factors: 
occurrence, severity, and detection. Risk priority numbers and fuzzy risk priority numbers 
were established. 
Hazard identification for ships in the Malacca Strait is an essential part of the risk 
assessment process. In this study, a list of relevant hazards that have occurred in the Malacca 
Strait was identified. 
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In order to establish the FMEA model using the fuzzy method, 10 scenarios were defined 
on the basis of AIS data and other data. These hypothetical scenarios were explored. 
Scenarios create a scope (or domain) in the fuzzy logic method. The value of the membership 
function ranged between zero and unity. The risk ranking for each scenario was determined, 
and “human error in general” had the highest risk number while “failure of machinery or 
electrical system” had the lowest. 
To lower the risk of collisions and ensure the safety of marine traffic, countermeasures 
were established for each scenario as listed in Table 4.12. 
The continuation of this research will be not only to assess risk by using a risk matrix but 
also to develop a risk mitigation and cost-benefit analysis, both of which are recommended 
for decision-making as steps of an FSA. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Safety of Navigation Assessment  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The Malacca Straits is vital strategic for seaborne trade. However, it’s have risk area 
for navigation. The analysis of marine traffic safety in the Malacca Straits is very important 
to enhance navigational safety.  Navigational collisions are a major safety concern in many 
sea ports. 
The increasing traffic through the Malacca Straits poses significant risks to the 
biodiversity and the marine environment, to the livelihood of the coastal communities and to 
the fishing and tourism industries.  An examination of the casualty data in the Malacca 
Straits between 1975 and 1995 shows the serious accidents have occurred in high density 
traffic area [3].  Therefore, Current safety measures should be improved and supported with 
the relevant complementary services to face the challenges of development in East Asia 
associated with the increase in international shipping.  
The three littoral States of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have been co-operating 
since the early 1970s to enhance navigational safety in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. 
Various measures to enhance navigational safety and environmental protection in the Straits 
of Malacca and Singapore have been proposed by the three littoral States and adopted by the 
IMO.  The measures adopted by the IMO in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore include 
the following: Sea lanes and Traffic Separation Schemes ,  vessel Traffic Systems,  
mandatory ship reporting system  and  routing measures such as under keel clearance 
requirements and deep water routes.  
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Regulation 19 of SOLAS Chapter V - Carriage requirements for shipborne 
navigational systems and equipment - sets out navigational equipment to be carried on board 
ships, according to ship type. IMO adopted a new requirement (as part of a revised new 
chapter V) for all ships to carry AIS capable of providing information about the ship to other 
ships and to coastal authorities automatically. 
In this study, an AIS is implemented for the study on risk assessment of ship collision 
under the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREG) 
guidelines. In this context, AIS implemented as source of data and input for the risk 
assessment.  
 
5.2  Literature review 
 There are several authors have established the risk assessment for ship collision at 
the channel. Qu Xiaobo et al. [19] establish ship collision risk assessment for the Singapore 
Strait. In this paper, these three risk indices for the Singapore Strait are estimated by using the 
real time ship locations and sailing speeds provide by Lloyd’s MIU AIS.  
Mou et al. [7] used AIS data to analyze collision avoidance in busy waterways.  
They performed statistical analysis of ships involved in collisions.  Risk Assessment by 
Samson model has been established.  The authors take only into account ships (own ships) 
that have an encounter in the Traffic Separation Schema (TSS) of the port of Rotterdam. 
Pedersen et al. [20] introduced a model to calculate the collision risk in a congested 
shipping lane: (1) investigate the distribution of different categories of the traffic; (2) 
determine the individual geometrical collision diameter; and (3) integrate the number of 
encounters. 
Otto et al. [21] discussed about the element of risk analysis for collision and 
grounding of RoRo passenger ferry. In this study, the consequences of collision and 
grounding scenarios were estimated by introducing damage criteria that link the calculated 
distribution of damage size and damage location to monetary units. 
Jiacai et al. [17] established an AIS data visualization model for assessing maritime 
traffic situation. In this paper, propose a novel visualization model to appraise the maritime 
traffic situation based on ship’s automatic identification system. 
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J. Wang et al. [22] explored formal safety assessment (FSA) of containership.  In 
their paper, they use fault tree analysis (FTA) for hazard identification and evaluation of risk. 
Kobayashi et al. [1] purposed about the guideline for ship evacuation from tsunami attack. In 
their paper, AIS data used for analysis the ship which passed in the Osaka Bay, Japan.  
Pitana et al. [2] analyzed the evacuation of a large passenger vessel in the case of a pending 
tsunami using discrete event simulation (DES), which have considered a stochastic approach. 
In this paper, they are used the AIS data for calculated the sea traffic in the area. Zaman et al. 
[23] analyzed the maritime safety in the Malacca Straits using AIS data and Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP). In this case, the dangerous score analyzed based on AIS data and 
AHP. 
This study focus for usage of AIS and GIS to establish risk based navigation. Risk 
assessment includes the probability analysis and consequence analysis. In this case, the 
analysis of risk determined in the different condition and different time based on AIS data 
taken from AIS receiver system which have installed in the UTM Malaysia by Kobe 
University. Analysis of risk divided into 3 conditions; head on condition, crossing condition 
and overtaking condition. 
 
5.3  Investigation of AIS data 
5.3.1 AIS installation 
AIS provides an independent platform of traffic information that is able to enhance 
and support ship’s radar in collision avoidance manoeuvring. Depending upon the system’s 
specifications, near real-time Rate of Turn (ROT) and engine-speed may also be available, 
while voyage information and navigational status can be obtained via the AIS network.   
Through dedicated VHF frequencies, AIS information is transmitted between vessels, from 
vessels to shore, or vice versa. In simple terms, AIS is a technology to make ships good to 
each other. As an aid to collision avoidance, it records the information of ship behaviour, 
including the effects of human action and ship manoeuvrability.  The information includes 
the vessel’s name, its particulars, ship type, registration numbers, and destination as well as 
the vessel’s position, speed, and heading.  
80 
 
AIS is also designed to transmit and receive information about a vessel.  This 
information includes its identity, position, speed, and course, along with other relevant 
information. Vessels within AIS range can receive information transmitted by other vessels 
and display this information on a dedicated AIS display, a chartplotter, or a PC using 
navigation software.  Combined with a shore station, this system also offers port authorities 
and maritime safety bodies the ability to manage maritime traffic and reduce the hazards of 
marine navigation. 
According to the IMO, 2002, AIS information includes static, dynamic, and 
voyage-related elements. Static information is programmed into the unit at the time of 
commissioning. Dynamic information is derived from interfaces with a ship’s GPS and other 
sensors. Voyage-related data are entered manually by the ship's captain using a 
password-protected routine 
The actual sea traffic conditions of several ships in the Malacca Straits were 
investigated using an AIS receiver installed at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) in 
Malaysia.  All AIS data received by the equipment were continuously and automatically 
stored on the hard disk of a PC.  The data could be retrieved from the PC via the Internet 
and analyzed on another PC at any time. 
In this context, static information includes the vessel's maritime mobile service 
identity (MMSI), the name of the vessel, radio call sign, ship length, the draft of the ship, the 
IMO number, ship width, type of ship, and antenna position.  Dynamic information includes 
the longitude, latitude, time, course, rate of turn, and speed over ground.  Voyage-related 
information includes the draft of the ship, destination, and type of cargo. 
 
5.3.2  Analysis of the AIS data 
The study area of this research is shown in fig 1.2. The analysis of AIS data are 
shown in Fig.2.11-2.12 in Chapter 2. They are very useful for analysis of traffic density and 
probability. In this research, the probability assessment has been conducted based on AIS 
data investigation. The result calculation will be explored in the next section. 
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5.4 Safety of Navigation Analysis 
5.4.1 Risk Model based on AIS Data 
Risk assessment established based on AIS data and GIS. In this case, the actual data 
from AIS could analyze the probability and consequence. Figure 5.1 shows the encounter 
types according to COLREG. Based on AIS data and GIS, the analysis of risk is categorized 
into 3 parts: Head on, crossing and overtaking.  
 
Fig.5.1: Encounter types according to COLREG. 
 
 
The risk analysis is composed of two main activities: probability modelling and 
consequence modeling.  In this paper, probabilities have been established based on AIS data 
and hazard analysis.  The factors analyzed in assessing the ship collision probability are the 
head-on situation, crossing situation, overtaking situation, and traffic density, based on AIS 
and GIS (Geographic Information System) data. The traffic density can be determined as: 
 
 
    
  
    
          (5.1) 
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where    is the number of ships using the channel, D is the channel length, and   is the 
channel width.  Fig. 5.1 shows the area selected to calculate the traffic density and ship 
collision probability, based on AIS and GIS data. 
The ship collision probability per passage can be expressed as: 
 
                  (5.2) 
 
where    is the probability number of collisions per passage, and Pc is failures per passage 
or encounter.     can be expressed as: 
 
                  (5.3) 
where     is failures per hour and T is the time taken per passage. 
The probability number of collisions in the head-on and overtaking condition per 
passage can be expressed. As follows, assuming that four groups of ships have identical 
characteristics such as head on, overtaking, left and right side crossing. The expression is: 
 
                     (5.4) 
 
The number of collisions in the crossing condition per passage is: 
 
       (   )        (5.5) 
 
In Equations 5.4–5.5, B is the mean beam of meeting (m), L is the mean length of 
meeting (m). In this paper, equation 5.3-5.4 taken for calculation of ship collision probability 
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in the Malacca Straits based on AIS data and GIS. The number of collisions per year can then 
be determined as: 
 
Na = Pa × (365 × 24 / T)       (6) 
 
Tables 5.1–5.3 show estimations of ship collision probabilities in the selected area of 
the Malacca Straits. In the table 5.1-5.3 also show that Nm is arrival frequency of meeting 
ships. In this case, Nm is determined based on AIS and GIS, and Ni is determined according 
to equation 5.4 and 5.5. 
Based on AIS data, the scenario of probability assessment have been carried out with 
different time with actual data in the selected area. In this case, scenario taken in the time 
which have high traffic area, on 2.00h, 10.00h, and 22.00h. Result of probability assessment 
could be classified as shown in table 5.1-5.3. The probability indexes and consequence 
categories are shown in table 5.4. The factors analyzed in assessing the ship collision 
probability are the head-on situation, crossing situation, overtaking situation, and traffic 
density, using both AIS and GIS data. 
 
Table 5.1 Collision probability based on AIS data at 02.00h 
 
Table 5.2 Collision probability based on AIS data at 10.00h 
 
 
No  
              ( ) 
L 
(m) 
B(m) T       P 
1 Ship Head-on 12 4.4321E-08 0.1313 2E-05 
24688 180 30 
1 1.5E-05 1.96953E-06 0.207 
2 Ship Overtaking 15 5.5401E-08 0.16413 2E-05 1 1.5E-05 2.46192E-06 0.323 
3 Ship Crossing 36 1.3296E-07 1.37867 2E-05 1 1.5E-05 2.06801E-05 6.521 
 Total 63      8.37051E-06  
Node                ( ) L (m) B(m) T       P 
1 Ship Head-on 25 9.2334E-08 0.27355 2E-05 
24688 180 30 
1 1.5E-05 4.10319E-06 0.895 
2 Ship Overtaking 35 1.2927E-07 0.38296 2E-05 1 1.5E-05 5.74447E-06 1.761 
3 Ship Crossing 68 2.5115E-07 2.60416 2E-05 1 1.5E-05 3.90624E-05 23.268 
 Total 128      1.63034E-05  
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Table 5.3 Collision probability based on AIS data at 22.00h 
 
Table 5.4 Probability index and consequence categories. 
 
Probability 
Index 
Description 
1 Very 
unlikely 
Less than once 
per 1000 years 
P<1/1000 
2 Remote Once per 
100-1000 years 
P<1/100 
3 Occasional Once per 10-100 
years 
P<1/10 
4 Probable Once per 1-10 
years 
P<1 
5 Frequent More than once 
per year 
P=1 
Consequence 
categories 
Description 
A Does not result in injuries 
B Minor injuries 
C Major injuries 
D Death or total disability 
E Death or total disability for several person 
 
 
5.4.2 Consequence assessment 
The consequence analyses for each scenario have been carried out. For built risk level by 
using risk matrix, five categories are used as shown in Table 5.4. To determine the 
consequence analysis, five categories comprise the built risk level by using a risk matrix. 
Consequence analysis established in the different time based on AIS data scenario. The 
scenario taken in the time that has high traffic areas: 02.00, 10.00, 22.00.  
Table 1 shows the probability index and the consequence categories.  The consequence 
analysis is classified as the following: does not result in injuries, minor injuries, major 
Node                ( ) L (m) B(m) T       P 
1 Ship Head-on 19 7.0174E-08 0.2079 2E-05 
24688 180 30 
1 1.5E-05 3.11843E-06 0.519 
2 Ship Overtaking 26 9.6028E-08 0.28449 2E-05 1 1.5E-05 4.26732E-06 0.972 
3 Ship Crossing 48 1.7728E-07 1.83823 2E-05 1 1.5E-05 2.75735E-05 11.59 
 Total 93      1.16531E-05  
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injuries, death or total disability, and death or total disability of several people. To determine 
the consequence analysis, the consequence categories areas are established based on 
Kristiansen model. In this case, categories of consequence are based on result of probability 
index on probability calculation. The results of the consequence analysis and probability 
analysis are plotted as a risk matrix. 
 
5.4.3 Constructing Risk Matrix 
Table 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 shows the risk matrix for analysis probability and consequence in 
the Malacca Straits based on AIS data and GIS.  Based on AIS data, the scenario of 
probability assessment have been carried out with different time with actual data. In this case, 
scenario taken in the time which have high traffic area, on 2.00h, 10.00h, and 22.00h.  
Table 5.5 shows the risk matrix at 2.00h scenario based on AIS.  In this case, Risk matrix is 
established based on result of probability assessment and consequence assessment. In this 
condition, number of ship in head on encounter is 12, crossing encounter is 15, and 
overtaking encounter is 36. The numbers of ships are determined based on AIS data in the 
selected area in the Malacca Straits as shown in Fig.1. Based on probability index, head on, 
crossing and overtaking are respectively classified at point 4, 4, 5. And based on consequence 
analysis, head on, crossing and overtaking are respectively classified at point C, C, D. The 
tolerable condition is for head on and crossing encounters. And Intolerable condition is for 
overtaking encounter.  
Table 5.6 shows the risk matrix in the 10.00h scenario based on AIS.  The risk level 
has been established in Head on condition, crossing condition and overtaking condition. 
Based on AIS, the number of ship in head on is 25, crossing is 35 and overtaking is 68. Based 
on probability index, head on, crossing and overtaking are respectively classified at point 4, 
5, 5. And based on consequence analysis, head on, crossing and overtaking are respectively 
classified at point C, D, D. In this case, risk level conditions are: head on in the tolerable 
level, crossing in the intolerable level and overtaking in the intolerable level.  
Table 5.7 shows the risk matrix in the 22.00h scenario based on AIS.  The risk level has 
been established in Head on condition, crossing condition and overtaking condition.  In this 
condition, number of ship in head on is 19, crossing is 26 and overtaking is 48.  The risk 
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level conditions are head on in the tolerable level, crossing in the tolerable level and 
overtaking in the intolerable level.   
The result of safety of navigation based on risk assessment using AIS data in the different 
time is very important for navigators to be careful if transit in this area. Those results are also 
useful for make safety measure and risk mitigation to enhance a safety in the Malacca Straits. 
 
Table 5.5: Risk matrix based on AIS data at 02.00h. 
 
 
 
Table 5.6: Risk matrix based on AIS data at 10.00h. 
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Table 5:7 Risk matrix based on AIS data at 22.00h. 
 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions  
In this context, the AIS were implemented as a source of data for the hazard 
identification and ship collision probability of the risk assessment step of the FSA.  
Based on the AIS data, the ship population passing through the Malacca Straits on 
6/2/2010 was calculated. This was broken down as: tanker ships 46%, cargo ships 27%, tugs 
8%, passenger ships 8%, LNG 5% and other ships 5%. 
Based on AIS data, the scenario of risk assessment have been carried out with 
different time with actual data. The risk level has been established in Head on condition, 
crossing condition and overtaking condition. scenario taken in the time which have high 
traffic area, on 2.00h, 10.00h, and 22.00h. 
The future work is establishing the reduction of risk and safety measure (risk control 
option), cost benefit analysis and recommendation of decision making.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Discussions and Conclusions 
 
6.1 Discussions 
The analysis and evaluation of marine traffic safety using AIS data in the Malacca 
Straits were conducted. In this research, additional assessment may be required to develop a 
safety of navigation that is useful to increase the ship safety navigation in the high risk area 
such as the Malacca Straits. The information which required explained below: 
 
6.1.1 Safety Measure and Cost-Benefit Assessment 
The safety measure and cost benefit assessment are steps of formal safety assessment 
that recommended by IMO. High risk areas can be identified after establishing a risk 
assessment and then the development of risk control measures can be initiated. Risk control 
measures can assist in reducing the occurrence likelihood of failures and/or mitigating their 
possible effects and consequences. Structural review techniques may be used to identify all 
possible risk control measure for cost-effective decision making. The safety measure is 
generated from the results of risk assessment which is established based on AIS data. In this 
case, the data about the ship’s collision from navigators and stakeholder in the maritime field 
are required.  
 
6.1.2 Optimization of Safety Route of Navigation 
By using AIS data, the establishments of danger score, evaluation of risk and safety 
navigation assessment have been conducted in this research. However, the development of 
safety navigation by optimization of safety route of navigation is very important to enhance 
89 
 
the safety in the high risk area such as Malacca Straits. The collision avoidance will be 
established by using the optimization of safety rote of navigation. There are several method 
for determine the safety route of navigation, such as fuzzy logic method, Genetic Algorithm 
etc. The method can be combined with the AIS data and GIS technologies. 
 
6.1.3 Evacuation Assessment of Ship’s Accident in the Channel 
The Malacca Straits is high risk area for navigation. The ship’s accidents have 
occurred in this area frequency. The evacuation assessment is required to enhance the safety 
of navigation. The evacuation assessment can be conducted for the ships and for the 
passengers. By using AIS data, the evacuation assessment can be established.  
 
6.2 Conclusions 
The analysis of marine traffic safety in the Malacca Straits had been established. The 
evaluation of dangerous area, the evaluation of the risk collision and the safety of navigation 
assessment had been carried out. The evaluation of marine traffic safety by determining the 
danger score are conducted in Chapter 3. The risk evaluation of ship collision in the marine 
traffic had been explored in the Chapter 4, and the safety navigation assessment by 
establishing the risk matrix had been carried out in Chapter 5. 
In chapter 3, the implementation of AIS for evaluate marine traffic safety in the 
Malacca Straits had been carried out. The AIS is implemented as a source of data that 
describes the characteristics of ships’ traffic volume determined using a geographic 
information system (GIS).  AHP is therefore used for evaluating the safety level in the Strait 
of Malacca. In this case, weighting factors are determined using AHP. The evaluation criteria 
are divided into five: Ship condition, human factor, environmental factor, machinery factor 
and navigational factor. Each criterion divides into sub-criteria and sub-sub-criteria. By 
combining AHP method and AIS, the simulation and calculation results of the danger score 
are presented. 
In Chapter 4, the risk evaluation of ship’s collision in the Malacca Straits had been 
established. The evaluations of risk and hazard identification are useful to enhance the safety. 
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In this Chapter, ten scenarios established. The investigation of sea traffic using AIS data and 
GIS in the Malacca Straits is carried out. The proposed FMEA-Fuzzy method for the 
evaluation of ship collision risk is described. Finally, The risk ranking results are explored.  
In Chapter 5, the assessment of safety navigation using AIS data had been carried out. 
In this chapter, the traffic density and probability assessment is calculated based on AIS data. 
Consequences analysis had been determined. In this Chapter, scenario of risk matrix 
established based on actual condition using AIS data with different time and different 
encounter situation. The head on situation, crossing situation and overtaking situation had been 
analyzed.   
The conclusions of research are summarized as follows: 
1. Using the AHP, several factors that contribute to accidents in the Strait of Malacca 
were revealed. In the Strait of Malacca, from 1975 to 1995, a total of 496 casualties 
were recorded. These involved collisions, contacts, founderings, standings, fire, 
engine troubles, bilgings and leakages. 35 of the 111 collision cases have caused 
foundering of the ships, led to fire and explosion or leakages leading to wrecks. 
2.  An analysis of several factors that contribute to accidents in the Strait of Malacca 
indicates the following. First: Ship condition. In the ship condition, the following 
items are considered: type of ship, length of ship, speed of ship and state of loading. 
In the actual accident based on type of ship, General cargo ships are at the top the 
list at 53.15%, followed by tankers at 20.59%, bulk carriers at 6.72%, fishing craft 
at 4.41%, container ships at 2.94% and liquefied gas carriers at 1.68%. . Secondly, 
the human element is the most important factor. Several accidents occurred caused 
by human error. In this case, experience and knowledge, fatigue, overwork, 
communication are factors that are important for navigators. Thirdly, the 
environmental factors will be discussed. In fact, serious accidents have occurred in 
high traffic density areas. Current, speed other ships, length of other ships, distance 
between vessels, wind effect, characteristics of area are factors that have 
contributed to the accidents in the Strait of Malacca. Further on, the machinery 
factors are described. The high percentage of leaking ships and ships limping with 
machinery problems must be viewed with deep concern because such casualties can 
easily develop into or cause catastrophic accidents. In the machinery factors, failure 
of main engine and electrical power, failure of lubricating oil system, failure of 
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navigation equipment, failure of rudder, failure of hull equipment and failure of 
propulsion should be considered. Finally, the navigational factors are discussed. 
This factor can contribute to the accident in the Strait of Malacca. Inappropriateness 
of ship operation regulation management, inappropriateness of crew manning, 
inappropriateness of navigational aid are important variable that should be 
evaluated in order to increase the navigational safety in the marine traffic.  
3. To assess the danger score, criteria of human factors, machinery factors and 
navigational factors could not be evaluated using AIS data. These criteria were 
determined from a questionnaire. The questionnaire was distributed among the 
navigators who have experienced passing through the Strait of Malacca. As a 
complex system with multiple subjects and multiple levels of ship safety 
navigation, an evaluation index of ship navigational safety was compiled to make 
the levels more certain and accurate using AIS data. The process of the assessment 
is as follows: 
At first, the weight of the evaluation index of each criterion (ship condition, human 
factors, environmental factors, machinery factors and navigational factors) and its 
related sub-criteria are established using AHP. Therefore, the value of the function 
of sub-sub-criteria is determined based on AIS data. 
4. In order to obtain and create the model of ship collision in the Malacca Straits 
using Fuzzy method, ten scenarios have been established based on AIS data, GIS 
and other data source. Firstly,  the classification of the ship’s behavior such as 
type of ship, ship condition, characteristics of the area, distance between vessels, 
etc. were analyzed based on AIS data and GIS. Therefore, interviews with the 
navigators that have experienced passing through the Malacca Straits have been 
conducted. The scenarios are also defined based on previous literature related to 
the safety of navigation in the Malacca Straits. 
5. The scenarios with higher defuzzified values are considered to be more risky. 
Human error has the highest risk ranking. It is respectively followed by crossing 
situation, head on situation, short distance between vessels, speed of own ship and 
target ship, high traffic density, overtaking situation, error of navigation, bed 
weather condition and failure of machinery and electrical system. This result, 
called fuzzy risk ranking, is very important as it gives useful information to the 
navigators when passing through the Malacca Straits. It is also useful for 
92 
 
navigators in order to prevent from accidents and to reduce the ship’s collision 
risk in the Malacca Straits. 
6. The risk assessment in safety of navigation is composed of two main activities: 
probability modeling and consequence modeling.  The probabilities have been 
established based on AIS data and hazard analysis.  The factors analyzed in 
assessing the ship collision probability are the head-on situation, crossing 
situation, overtaking situation, and traffic density, based on AIS and GIS. 
7. Based on AIS data, the scenario of risk assessment have been carried out with 
different time with actual data. The risk level has been established in Head on 
condition, crossing condition and overtaking condition. scenario taken in the time 
which have high traffic area, on 2.00h, 10.00h, and 22.00h. 
There are correlation regarding chapter 3, chapter 4 and chapter 5. 
In the chapter 3, Evaluation of marine traffic safety in the Malacca Straits as busy area 
has been carried out using AIS data. Danger score assessment using AHP method has been 
established by considering several factors such as ship condition, human factors, 
environmental factors, machinery and electrical factors and navigational factors.  By 
combination with AIS, the danger score was determined. The danger area in the Malacca 
Straits is useful for navigational field. The information regarding danger score area based on 
actual data is useful to enhance navigation safety. 
After, danger score has established, the establishment of risk for collision has been 
conducted. In this case, in chapter 4, Fuzzy FMEA modelings are used. Several 
considerations in the chapter 4 such as human factors, environmental factors and condition 
ship are including in this analysis. However, in the chapter 4 did not appear the probability 
analysis, severity and detection. In the chapter 4, probability, severity and detection using 
Fuzzy FMEA modeling have been carried out.  By using this method and AIS, risks ranking 
of collision in the Malacca Straits are established.  The countermeasures are conducted to 
enhance the safety of navigation.  
Establishment of safety of navigation has been conducted in chapter 5. The scenario 
by the different time has been carried out base on AIS data. The traffic density is determined 
for establish the probability analysis and consequence analysis. Based on chapter 3 and 
chapter 4, the head on situation, crossing situation and overtaking situation are categorized as 
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danger situation. By using risk matrix, the risk area with different time, risk of head on 
situation, crossing situation and overtaking situation are established. 
The analysis and evaluation of marine traffic by using AIS and AHP method, Fuzzy 
FMEA method and Risk Matrix are useful to enhance the marine traffic safety. 
 
6.3 Further Researches 
The analysis of marine traffic safety in the Malacca Straits based on AIS data had 
been conducted. Based on discussion and result of assessment, there are several possibilities 
of further research could be established in order to enhance the safety of navigation in the 
high risk area such as Malacca Straits as follows: 
1. The establishment of the safety measure and cost-benefit assessment using AIS 
data. 
2. The development of optimization for safety route of navigation using AIS data. 
3. The evaluation of ships evacuation for ship’s accident using AIS data. The 
assessment of ship evacuation for ship’s accident is very important to enhance the 
safety of navigation in the high risk area. 
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